FINAL REPORT

Anti-Doping Rule Violations and related allegations of misconduct from 2009 to 2019

INTERNATIONAL WEIGHTLIFTING FEDERATION

24 JUNE 2021
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. In the interest of transparency, in furtherance of the International Testing Agency ("ITA")’s mission to foster clean sport, and in order to preserve the integrity of sport through the fight against doping, the ITA shares its findings regarding the allegations of mishandling and impropriety by certain officials of the International Weightlifting Federation ("IWF") – and its national member federations – pertaining in particular to the IWF anti-doping program between the years 2009 and 2019 and in the sport of weightlifting in general.

2. As a background, these allegations of misconduct were uncovered and publicly exposed by a number of different sources1 over the past 18 months. More specifically, Prof. McLaren’s independent investigator report on the IWF ("the McLaren Report on the IWF"), which was triggered by the ARD Documentary, outlined a series of allegations that a large number of unprocessed cases of anti-doping rule violations ("ADRVs") predating the delegation by the IWF of its anti-doping program to the ITA were discovered during their investigation. Those cases were passed to the ITA for investigation and appropriate action where possible.

3. The main purpose of this report is to provide clear answers to the allegations which have been put in the public domain. The ITA believes that this duty of transparency is owed to the athletes, the IWF and all anti-doping stakeholders.

4. As a preliminary remark, the ITA notes that the McLaren Report on the IWF concluded that “all the inadequacies of the IWF operations of the ADCP [Anti-Doping Control Program] have become historical”2, due to the transfer of the IWF anti-doping program to the ITA. In this regard, the ITA has worked tirelessly to resolve all pending and unresolved matters expeditiously. The ITA’s work culminates in the publication of its findings in the present report.

5. Based on the ITA’s clear mandate to operate in a fully independent manner in which it is entitled to take any and all necessary actions, measures and/or decisions on behalf of the IWF, as well as in compliance with the World Anti-Doping Code (the “Code”), the ITA conducted its independent investigation from November 2020 to June 2021 with a sharp focus on shedding light on past unprocessed and unsanctioned ADRVVs in the sport of weightlifting.

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1  Namely the documentary “Secret Doping – The Lord of the Lifters” (originally titled: “Geheimsache Doping: Der Herr der Heber”) by the German broadcaster ARD (“the ARD Documentary”), the Independent Investigator Report to the Oversight and Integrity Commission of the IWF produced by Professor Richard H. McLaren (“the McLaren Report on the IWF”) and the WADA Intelligence & Investigation (“the WADA I&I”) reports.

6. In this context, this report provides an overview of the findings of the investigation into approximately 146 unresolved cases over the period 2009-2019.

7. As this report will show, the ITA was hampered by the depth and breadth of the IWF’s past years of inaction, which resulted in 29 unsanctioned doping violations being impossible to prosecute due to the statute of limitation and/or destruction of evidence. The reasons why these cases were unprocessed and/or unsanctioned ranged from mere administrative oversight, poor recordkeeping, chaotic organisational processes or jurisdictional errors – at one end of the spectrum – to indifference, outright negligence, complicity, or – at worst – blatant and intentional cover-ups from the IWF and certain Member Federations.

8. Over the course of the ITA investigation, it transpired that the IWF and Member Federation Officials had themselves also committed ADRVs of Complicity and Tampering in relation to certain unprocessed cases.

9. In the scope of the ITA’s mandate to “vigorously pursue all potential ADRVs” under the IWF’s jurisdiction, the ITA has thus asserted ADRVs against the following officials. The individuals have been informed of the charges and corresponding rights on 23 June 2021.

Mr Tamás Aján, former IWF President – charged with Complicity and Tampering for multiple ADRVs

A. Allowing an athlete to participate in the 2012 London Olympic Games whilst she was provisionally suspended for two ADRVs

10. In April 2012, Romanian athlete Roxana Cocos (“Ms Cocos”) tested positive for anabolic steroids at the European Championships in Antalya, Turkey. Initially, the IWF duly provisionally suspended her for her ADRV in May 2012 when initiating the results management of the case. Mr Nicolae Vlad (“Mr Vlad”), President of the Romanian Weightlifting Federation and IWF Vice-President, was personally informed of the case.

11. In addition, on 20 July 2012, on the eve of the 2012 London Olympic Games (“the London Games”), the IWF was informed that DNA evidence made it clear that the athlete had also swapped her urine samples over the course of 2010 and 2012.

12. The same day, Mr Tamás Aján (“Mr Aján”) notified Mr Vlad of the evidence against Ms Cocos and instructed Mr Vlad to remove the athlete from the Olympics “to try and avoid any scandals right before the London Olympic Games.”

13. On 24 July 2012, the IWF formally informed the athlete and Mr Vlad of the additional charge of urine manipulation and that the athlete was (again) provisionally suspended.

14. However, on 1 August 2012 Ms Cocos nevertheless competed in the London Games and won a silver medal, with the full knowledge and complicity of both Mr Aján and Mr Vlad, whose acts or omissions allowed Ms Cocos to nevertheless compete in the London Games despite Ms Cocos having been twice provisionally suspended by the IWF for ADRVs.

15. Since then, it has been well documented that Ms Cocos was subsequently disqualified after it came to light that she was, still at that time, positive for anabolic steroids after re-analysis of
her samples from the London Games by the ITA on behalf of the International Olympic Committee (“IOC”) in 2019. However, she should never have been allowed to participate in the London Games, given the clear evidence of her having resorted to urine substitution and having used anabolic steroids in the lead-up to the London Games.

B. Delaying results management to allow athletes to compete in events in 2013

16. The ITA investigation confirms the allegations that Mr Aján provided favouritism to certain countries, the Azerbaijan Weightlifting Federation (“AWF”) being one of them. Based on substantiated evidence, the ITA asserts that Mr Aján intentionally allowed and implemented the cover-up of 23 Adverse Analytical Findings (“AAFs”) committed by Azerbaijani weightlifters during the year 2013.

17. The IWF, under the direction of Mr Aján, intentionally hid and/or delayed the notification of the AAFs of several Azerbaijani athletes. These positive cases were neither sanctioned in a timely manner nor publicly published on the IWF website. Instead, the IWF publicly communicated about this matter only several months later, in a convoluted statement that gave no names of athletes or information on sanctions imposed. The ITA investigation concludes that the IWF, under the direction of Mr Aján, purposefully concealed the cases from WADA for months so as to allow the Azerbaijani athletes to compete in the 2013 IWF World Championships in Poland in October 2013 and the 2013 IWF Grand Prix & 2nd Baku International Cup in December 2013.

18. The ITA investigation found that the letter of 11 October 2013 sent by Mr Aján to the AWF3, in which Mr Aján admits the wrongdoing, is authentic:

“I cannot take any responsibility or accept such serious violation of the IWF Anti-Doping rules and the objectives of our sport. This is clearly a moral massacre regarding the athletes.” […]

“Now I know that it was a terrible mistake when earlier this year I did not insist on the application of stricter sanctions on your lifters and coaches.” […]

“The mentioned cases will not yet be published but I can no longer take the responsibility in front of the WADA and the IOC for your federation.”[…]

19. The same conclusion applies to the subsequent letter sent by Mr Aján to the AWF on 10 December 2013:4

“What we have done for your athletes and Federation is something the IWF has never done before and not willing or able to do in the future. The knot tightens around my neck and my 45 years work could go down in a blink.” […]

“Kindly ask you to have this letter translated for you…and following delete it from your emails and destroy it completely.”

20. Further, the ITA investigation found that the IWF compounded its complicity in covering up these doping results in March 2014 by purposely and intentionally backdating doping notification and sanction letters for these Azerbaijani athletes to make it appear that they

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3 This letter was first published in the article by Grit Hartmann and Nick Butler, “FBI and Swiss Police dig into the weightlifting scandal, while IOC is undecided”, posted on Play the Game on 12 November 2020.

4 Ibid.
were notified and sanctioned in October 2013, not only to lead WADA astray, but also to have allowed those athletes to compete in the 2013 IWF World Championships in Poland in October 2013 and the 2013 IWF Grand Prix & 2nd Baku International Cup in December 2013.

C. Obstructing the IWF’s results management of ADRVs prior to 2014

21. The ITA investigation found that, despite repeated requests from WADA to the IWF for the status of pending cases, Mr Aján obstructed WADA’s inquiries into the pending cases for AAFs prior to the year 2014 by deliberately not inquiring into their potential resolution and by deliberately not following up on WADA’s correspondence, or by providing WADA with purposely incomplete information.

22. In addition to Mr Aján’s purposeful obstruction of WADA’s inquiries into pending (unsanctioned/unprocessed) cases prior to 2014, Mr Aján deliberately refused to instruct IWF staff to pursue and/or process these ADRVs. Further, Mr Aján’s obstruction and failure to ensure that cases were processed allowed for 50 unprocessed and unsanctioned ADRV including 29 cases that the ITA could not salvage.

Mr Nicolae Vlad, President of the Romanian Weightlifting Federation and IWF Vice-President – charged with Complicity and Tampering for allowing an athlete who was a member of his federation to participate in the 2012 London Olympic Games whilst she was provisionally suspended for two ADRVs

23. As described in the section about Ms Cocos’ prohibited participation in the London Games (see paragraphs 10 to 15), Mr Vlad has been charged with an ADRV for Complicity and Tampering.

Mr Hasan Akkus, former President of the Turkey Weightlifting Federation (TWF) and current President of the European Weightlifting Confederation – charged with Tampering in order to avoid the TWF facing Article 12 sanctions

24. As a result of its investigation the ITA asserts that, in 2013, Mr Hasan Akkus (“Mr Akkus”), then president of the Turkey Weightlifting Federation (“TWF”), colluded with the IWF to change the responsible authority (i.e. the Results Management Authority) for 17 Turkish athletes from the IWF to the TWF. The athletes in question tested positive in November and December of 2012 in connection with testing missions conducted by the IWF.

25. The purpose of this plot was to avoid the TWF being sanctioned by the IWF under the regime of sanctions imposed on Member Federations in the event that multiple ADRVs are committed by their athletes (known as “Article 12 sanctions”). Considering that, for Article 12 sanctions, only IWF cases are taken into account and not national ADRVs, the requalification of the sanctions to national-level allowed the TWF and its official to avoid being banned from participating in any IWF activities for a period of up to 4 years and allowed the TWF to avoid the payment of a fine of up to USD 500,000.
26. Mr Akkus, for his part, personally pleaded with Mr Aján to “help” him, as the “[l]ast situation is very heavy and bad for my federation and my self [sic].” Thereafter, the ITA investigation found that, in January 2013, Mr Akkus tampered with the results management process by sending an email to the IWF stating that he would prepare a letter backdated to 5 November 2012 (which was before the IWF-ordered mission) to falsely claim that the out-of-competition tests were organised by the TWF with the IWF’s assistance.

27. Further, Mr Akkus requested that the IWF send him “the documents” to “start (the) procedure here” in Turkey. The athletes in question were ultimately sanctioned by the TWF.

28. The ITA will thus also be referring the case of the TWF to the IWF Independent Member Federations Sanctioning Panel so that the consequences that should have been applied in 2012 are imposed.

Follow-up on ARD Documentary allegations and WADA I&I Operation Arrow

29. As will be detailed in this Report, the ITA has also followed up on many of the doping allegations initially exposed by the ARD Documentary by charging the individuals for ADRVs such as Ms Rattikan Gulnoi, a Thai Athlete, who admitted to doping during a covert interview and Mr Dorin Balmus, a doctor of the Moldavian Weightlifting Federation, for his complicity in sample swapping cases. The ITA has equally launched proceedings against athletes for urine manipulation based on cases passed on by WADA I&I.

CONCLUSION

30. Since the outset, the approach of the ITA’s investigation was an evidence-based, fact-finding inquiry into allegations of misconduct at the IWF in the years 2009–2019. And the ITA did exactly that – find facts. Through the investigation, the ITA found evidence of serious misconduct by IWF officials that amount to ADRVs and the ITA has accordingly asserted ADRVs for tampering and complicity against the responsible officials, as detailed above.

31. While a lot of work remains to be done to change the culture of doping in the sport of weightlifting, the ITA is encouraged by the many ongoing reforms and the fact that all anti-doping operations are now fully and independently handled by the ITA. The previous deficiencies identified in this report, as well as during other investigations on the sport of weightlifting, would no longer be possible under the current framework. In addition, the conclusions of the ITA investigation demonstrate that the independent management of anti-doping programs, such as by the ITA, is extremely important for the integrity and credibility of sport. In fact, this report illustrates why the delegation by the IWF of its anti-doping program to the ITA works and was the right decision.

32. While other investigations on the sport of weightlifting are still ongoing and are not included in this report, it is the ITA’s belief and intent that this report will enable the IWF to get to the bottom of the past misconduct, fix its issues – once and for all – and finally turn the page from past wrongdoing and focus on the development of its sport and the promotion of its athletes,
while the ITA ensures professional and independent anti-doping operations for the sport of weightlifting, free from any political, national or sporting interests.

33. To this end, the ITA has identified a number of action items that could help reinforce the global anti-doping system and will be liaising with WADA, as the global anti-doping regulator, to address these constraints. For example, the systematic long-term storage of anti-doping samples in the ITA’s Centralized long-term storage facility must be encouraged to ensure that samples remain available for re-analysis for up to 10 years after their collection. In addition, special attention must be dedicated to other key areas, such as whereabouts management, identity management, ADAMS access, results management follow-ups, doping control officers’ supervision and certification, and an intelligence-based approach to anti-doping.

34. Lastly, significant credit must be given to the ARD Documentary and the subsequent McLaren Report on the IWF. Robust investigative journalism, coupled with whistleblowing by athletes and other concerned professionals, including IWF staff, as well as investigative work by ITA and WADA, has played an important role in helping expose these allegations of delayed notification, absence of sanctions, and other alleged misconduct in the sport of weightlifting.
1. BACKGROUND INFORMATION: TIMELINE AND BRIEF SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS


35. On 5 January 2020, the broadcast of the documentary “Secret Doping – The Lord of the Lifters” (originally titled: “Geheimsache Doping: Der Herr der Heber”) by the German broadcaster ARD (“the ARD Documentary”), produced by Hajo Seppelt, Nick Butler and Grit Hartmann (“the ARD Team”), made public allegations of financial and electoral corruption and mishandling of the anti-doping program against the International Weightlifting Federation (“IWF”), amongst others.

36. The gist of the allegations pertaining to anti-doping matters contained in the ARD Documentary was as follows:

- the extract of an interview with a Thai weightlifter, Ms Rattikan (Siripuch) Gulnoi (“Ms Gulnoi”), with an undercover reporter, where she makes statements suggesting that she took doping agents to enhance her performance as part of her preparation for the 2012 London Olympic Games (“the London Games”).

- the extract of an interview with Dr Dorin Balmus (“Dr Balmus”), National Team Doctor of the Moldovan Weightlifting Federation, filmed with a hidden camera, in which Dr Balmus talks about the cover-up practice where doping control officers are paid off to turn a blind eye to “doppelgängers” providing (clean) urine samples in lieu of the (“dirty”) athletes.

1.2. THE REACTION: THE INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATOR REPORT TO THE IWF OVERSIGHT AND INTEGRITY COMMISSION

37. As an immediate reaction to the ARD Documentary, on 22 January 2020 the IWF Executive Board put in place an Oversight and Integrity Commission (“IWF O&I Commission”) tasked with shedding light on the ARD allegations.

38. On 31 January 2020 the IWF Executive Board appointed Professor Richard H. McLaren to act as “Independent Investigator” to carry out the IWF O&I Commission’s investigation into the ARD allegations, with a focus on the financial and electoral corruption claims.5

39. On 4 June 2020, Prof. McLaren issued a public report on its findings (“the McLaren Report on the IWF”), exposing the financial and electoral malpractices, amongst other things.6 Prof. McLaren also uncovered irregularities in the IWF anti-doping program, including the

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6 Ibid.
discovery of dozens of ADRVs which had apparently never been properly sanctioned. More specifically, Prof. McLaren reported on the following improprieties:

- The intentional delaying of the prosecution of 18 ADRV cases involving Azerbaijani athletes dating back to 2013, with a view to allow the athletes in question to participate in flagship events and as a favour to the Azerbaijan Weightlifting Federation.

- More than 40 ADRVs dating between 2009-2014 that were not pursued, including 21 ADRVs between 2010 and 2012 involving Turkish athletes.

- Evidence of tampering during doping controls conducted in the lead-up to the 2015 IWF World Championships held in Houston, USA.

40. The McLaren Report on the IWF was also supplemented by a non-public addendum submitted to “relevant stakeholders”.


1.3. WADA’S FOLLOW-UP INQUIRIES ON THE PENDING ADRVS

42. Based on the information provided by Prof. McLaren to WADA, on 12 June 2020 WADA called upon the IWF to take immediate action regarding 12 pending cases dating back as far as 2010 for which the 10-year statute of limitations was about to expire.

43. On 16 June 2020, WADA formally asked the IWF to confirm that the 18 Azerbaijani athletes had been properly sanctioned and to provide background information on the timelines of the results management process.

44. After review of the information provided by Prof. McLaren and further research\(^7\), on 18 August 2020, WADA issued a notice to the IWF which read as following: “\([a]\)ccording to our records, the IWF has 146 pending cases which occurred between 1 January 2009 and 31 December 2019. These cases are where an ADRV may be, or has been, alleged against an athlete or other person (e.g. as a result of an adverse analytical finding or an investigation) by the IWF but WADA has not received notice of a reasoned decision.” The IWF was asked to resolve those matters which were potentially time-barred (or about to be time-barred) by 18 September 2020, and to resolve all the other pending matters by 18 February 2021.

45. The IWF was warned by WADA that, should the IWF fail to properly process the ADRVs within the deadlines set, WADA would consider whether Code Compliance follow-up would be required.

46. On two occasions, WADA also asked the IWF about its position in respect of the prosecution of the former IWF President, Mr Aján, based on the revelations of the McLaren Report on the IWF.

1.4. WADA I&I REPORT INTO THE IWF AND THE SPORT OF WEIGHTLIFTING

47. On 22 October 2020, WADA’s Intelligence and Investigations Department (“WADA I&I”) issued a public report to convey its work on the IWF since 2017 (“WADA I&I Report on the IWF”). The document described four investigations which looked into wrongdoings related to anti-doping practices in the sport of weightlifting, including “Operation Arrow”, which pertained to the practice of urine substitution by athletes and the use of doppelgängers within the sport of weightlifting, on which the ITA will focus later in this report.

2. THE ITA’S GENERAL MANDATE (ON BEHALF OF THE IWF)

2.1. BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE ITA

48. On the initiative of the International Olympic Committee (“IOC”), and with the consensus of the Olympic Movement and the support of WADA, the International Testing Agency (“ITA”) was created at the beginning of 2018 in the wake of the doping cover-up scandal involving the Russian authorities uncovered in 2015.9

49. The ITA was established as a Swiss not-for-profit foundation whose underlying purpose is to make the fight against doping independent of sporting or political powers. To that end, the ITA’s mission is to implement anti-doping programs independently on behalf of sporting organisations, including International Federations and Major Event Organisers. The ITA has been operational since July 2018.

2.2. THE ITA’S MANDATE FOR THE IWF

50. In the autumn of 2018 and in furtherance of the IWF’s efforts to strengthen its anti-doping program with a view to maintaining the sport of weightlifting in the 2024 Summer Olympic Program,11 the IWF, represented by its then president, Mr Aján, appointed the ITA to run parts of its anti-doping program. In order to ensure a smooth transition of operations, the ITA took over the different areas of the anti-doping program, such as Therapeutic Use Exemption, Testing, Athlete Biological Passports, etc, in an incremental manner between 1 January and 1 September 2019, when the entire program was fully outsourced to the ITA.12

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10 See the ITA’s Statutes https://ita.sport/uploads/2021/02/English.pdf.
12 See https://www.iwf.net/2018/11/06/iwf-joins-international-testing-agency-ita/.
mandate was intended to last until 31 December 2020, and has been extended in the autumn of 2020 until the end of 2024.

51. The results management of ADRVs was handed over to the ITA in June 2019. At that stage, the ITA was mandated to manage ADRVs arising from June 2019 onwards. In other words, the ITA would be responsible for the prosecution of any “new” cases, including cases that predate the present but would only come to light now, such as re-analysis cases. Since the ITA’s mandate only concerned “new” cases, the IWF did not inform the ITA of, or hand over, its ADRV archives or pending files.

52. The delegation of results management activities also includes any follow-up investigations into potential claims pertaining to ADRVs. Under the IWF’s delegation, the ITA has the powers to take all necessary measures, such as conducting interviews and ordering further analysis on samples, and where appropriate to bring forward charges against individuals on behalf of IWF.

53. Pursuant to the contractual terms of the delegation agreement between the IWF and the ITA, which apply to all ITA partners, the ITA is to:

i) manage the anti-doping program in full compliance with the IWF Anti-Doping Rules (“IWF ADR”) and the World Anti-Doping Code (“the Code”); and

ii) operate in an independent manner and to take all necessary actions, measures and/or decisions on behalf of the IWF to carry out the IWF’s Code-related obligations.

54. In turn, the IWF has the obligation to provide the ITA with all the necessary and useful information with a view to enable the ITA to perform its work.

3. THE ITA’S INVESTIGATION: SCOPE

55. The ITA, on behalf of the IWF, must abide by the Code obligation to:

“vigorously pursue all potential ADRV within their authority including investigation into whether Athlete Support Personnel or other Persons may have been involved in each case of doping, to ensure proper enforcement of Consequences, and to conduct an automatic investigation of Athlete Support Personnel in the case of any anti-doping rule violation involving a Protected Person or Athlete Support Person who has provided support to more than one Athlete found to have committed an anti-doping rule violation.”

56. Within its IWF mandate the ITA must also “cooperate fully with WADA in connection with investigations conducted by WADA pursuant to Article 20.7.14.”

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13 See Article 20.3.12 of the Code.
14 See Article 20.3.16 of the Code.
57. The ITA’s unfettered sphere of action to “vigorously pursue all potential ADRV$s” relates exclusively to anti-doping matters under the IWF’s jurisdiction.

58. The IWF’s anti-doping jurisdiction is defined by the IWF ADR as follows:

These [IWF] Anti-Doping Rules shall apply to:

a. IWF, including its board members, directors, officers and specified employees, and Delegated Third Parties and their employees, who are involved in any aspect of Doping Control;

b. each of its Member Federations, including their board members, directors, officers and specified employees, and Delegated Third Parties and their employees, who are involved in any aspect of Doping Control;

c. the following Athletes, Athlete Support Personnel and other Persons:

   i. all Athletes and Athlete Support Personnel who are members of IWF, or of any Member Federation, or of any member or affiliate organization of any Member Federation (including any clubs, teams, associations, or leagues);

   ii. all Athletes and Athlete Support Personnel who participate in such capacity in Events, Competitions and other activities organized, convened, authorized or recognized by IWF, or any Member Federation, or by any member or affiliate organization of any Member Federation (including any clubs, teams, associations, or leagues), wherever held;

   iii. any other Athlete or Athlete Support Personnel or other Person who, by virtue of an accreditation, a license or other contractual arrangement, or otherwise, is subject to the authority of IWF, or of any Member Federation, or of any member or affiliate organization of any Member Federation (including any clubs, teams, associations, or leagues), for purposes of anti-doping; and

   iv. Athletes who are not regular members of IWF or of one of its Member Federations but who want to be eligible to compete in a particular International Event or IWF Event.

Each of the abovementioned Persons is deemed, as a condition of his or her participation or involvement in the sport, to have agreed to and be bound by these Anti-Doping Rules, and to have submitted to the authority of IWF to enforce these Anti-Doping Rules, including any Consequences for the breach thereof, and to the jurisdiction of the hearing panels specified in Article 8 and Article 13 to hear and determine cases and appeals brought under these Anti-Doping Rules. 15 […]"

59. Therefore, the ITA’s investigative efforts are focused only on anti-doping matters falling under the IWF’s jurisdiction. For such reasons and for the purposes of this report, those allegations outside of the anti-doping realm (such as those relating to financial and election corruption)

15 See Scope of these Anti-Doping Rules, Preface of the IWF Anti-Doping Rules, version in force since 1 January 2021.
and those concerning the National Anti-Doping Organisation of Hungary ("HUNADO") were not pursued by the ITA.

60. The ITA has, however, passed on relevant information discovered within the scope of its enquiries but falling outside its sphere of authority, to the competent authorities whenever useful. To be clear, any potential activities which could be classified as other misconduct which was identified in the ITA’s investigation was documented and corresponding referrals made to the competent bodies for consideration of further investigations.

61. As described in the following sections, the ITA pursued the mandate entrusted to it by the IWF to resolve the matters addressed by WADA in its letters of 12 June, 16 June and 18 August 2020, namely the 146 “pending” cases ("the WADA List"). The ITA also followed up on the claims contained in the ARD Documentary, the McLaren Report on the IWF and the WADA I&I findings as they came up, and along with the ITA’s activities into doping in the sport of weightlifting as per the ITA’s “general mandate” from the IWF.

4. THE ITA’S INVESTIGATION: METHODOLOGY & FACT-FINDING

4.1. INITIAL STEPS: GATHERING INFORMATION

62. When the ARD Documentary was released on 5 January 2020, the ITA reached out to the ARD Team to obtain the supporting information pertaining to the claims on anti-doping. With the assistance of Prof. McLaren and ARD, on 11 March 2020 the ITA was able to obtain the raw footage of the undercover videos recorded with athlete Ms Rattikan Gulnoi and coach Dr Dorin Balmus. The ITA had the recording translated and began gathering corroborative evidence against the two individuals.

63. On 18 January 2021, with the permission of the McLaren Investigation Team, WADA I&I shared related whistleblower information with the ITA. WADA I&I also shared intelligence from its Operations Heir, Outreach, Extra and Arrow with the ITA by way of multiple intelligence disclosures. Over the last months, the ITA and WADA I&I have had a close and fruitful relationship.

64. In relation to the McLaren Report on the IWF, despite several requests to Prof. McLaren and the IWF, the ITA only received the confidential addendum on the McLaren Report on the IWF “Anti-Doping – Suppression of Positive Samples, A Study Covering the Period 2009-2020 Addendum to Chapter 5 of the Report to the Oversight and Integrity Commission of International Weightlifting Investigation” ("Addendum to Chapter 5") on 5 and 6 January 2021.

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16 Given the highly confidential and sensitive nature of the ITA’s investigation, the full scope of its activities, and the findings of the investigation, were not shared with the IWF before this report. An exception to this is status updates on general findings in relation to the WADA List.
65. The full case file and the corresponding supporting documents were provided to the ITA by Prof. McLaren on 11 January 2021.

66. With regards to the WADA List, the information conveyed by WADA contained minimal information on the pending cases. In most instances, the only information available was the sample number associated with adverse analytical findings ("AAFs"), the date of the laboratory report and the prohibited substance detected.

67. To enable the ITA to review the pending cases, the IWF granted the ITA access to data ("IWF Records") pertaining to ADRVs for the relevant period. This entailed approximately 75,000 files amounting to over 75 GB of data.

4.2. INVESTIGATIVE TEAM

68. In terms of workforce, the ITA Legal Affairs Department was in charge of the results management aspects of the caseload and subsequent prosecution of the findings of the ITA’s investigation.

69. Given the scope and complexity of the mandate, a dedicated ITA Intelligence & Investigations team, comprising four investigative, analytical and intelligence experts, was established to assist the ITA with the intelligence and investigative focus of this caseload.

4.3. REVIEW OF EVIDENCE

70. As stated above, the IWF Records contained approximately 75 GB of data. From this, the ITA identified roughly 10,000 pertinent emails and 2,000 appended data files, including Excel sheets, pdfs, Word documents and assorted image files. The data was extracted, searched, and collated and then cross-checked with the IWF’s own records and available open sources, including internet archives. This culminated in a comprehensive and forensically compiled AAF tracking spreadsheet from the IWF Records.

71. Whilst such information enabled the ITA to resolve some matters and detect irregularities, overall the IWF Records provided little valuable information for most of the individual cases on the WADA List. However, it did enable the analysis of certain relevant communications related to ADRVs and the corresponding administration, or not, of AAFs, as detailed in Section 5 below.

72. In addition to a forensic review of the IWF Records, the ITA also (i) conducted 28 interviews with 15 interested parties, (ii) analysed and investigated information from 14 whistle-blowers (i.e. 8 from the hotline put in place by Prof. McLaren and 6 from the ITA’s whistleblowing platform, “REVEAL”), and (iii) produced over 75 investigative, interview or human source intelligence reports.

73. All materials collected were handled with the utmost care and sensitivity. All elements were safeguarded and stored appropriately in a secure and confidential manner.
74. The ITA limited itself to drawing evidence-based conclusions only. Where evidence was lacking or gaps existed\textsuperscript{17}, only the facts were presented as known to the ITA. Whist drawing conclusions and positing investigative theories – a routine step in any robust investigation – the ITA provided space to allow further conclusions to be derived by launching additional investigations. Nevertheless, the known facts have been provided, a situation which still allows for additional conclusions to be rendered.

4.4. TEMPORAL & OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS

75. In the course of its investigation, the ITA encountered the following statutory, technical and legal constraints.

A. ADAMS Retention Time

76. Due to the data retention time settings (for data privacy reasons), a great deal of information about the AAFs – including (i) laboratory analysis reports (i.e. the existence of AAFs), (ii) doping control forms (i.e. the identity of the athlete), etc. – were in fact no longer available in ADAMS\textsuperscript{18} by the time the ITA investigation began in the autumn of 2020.

77. Moreover, the ITA’s ability to properly investigate several allegations that required examination as to the veracity of athlete whereabouts information\textsuperscript{19} was restricted due to such data being retained for only 12-month periods.

B. Sample Retention Time

78. According to the International Standard for Laboratories (“ISL”) in force at the time, WADA-accredited laboratories (“Laboratories”) were required to retain samples for a minimum of 3 months.\textsuperscript{20} Afterwards, unless expressly instructed by the testing authority, the Laboratories were allowed to discard the samples.

79. As detailed below, due to the constraints of the sample retention time, the majority of samples in the WADA List were discarded by the respective Laboratories within months of sample collection, thus in certain cases preventing the ITA from pursuing the matter further.

\textsuperscript{17} There are several possible theoretical explanations for gaps in the investigation:
1. The matter ended and was not discussed further.
2. The matter continued to be discussed via an alternative forum - social messaging, voice calls or private emails.
3. The matter continued to be discussed during a personal meeting, of which there is no record.
Overall, the ITA identified that these scenarios were the preferred modus operandi of obfuscating communication trails as they leave little to no trace of outcomes of communications, important person-to-person decisions made, or agreements rendered.

\textsuperscript{18} ADAMS, the Anti-Doping Administration & Management System, is the doping control information database developed and maintained by WADA where anti-doping stakeholders, such as WADA-accredited laboratories, International Federations, and Sample Collection Agencies, are expected to share data such as doping control tests results, therapeutic use exemptions, and athletes’ whereabouts.

\textsuperscript{19} Given that intentional misreporting of whereabouts information in ADAMS emerged as a one of the key modus operandi in weightlifting, this restriction not only impacted older investigative enquiries, but also the ability to develop an effective, intelligence-driven and targeted testing approach to weightlifting.

\textsuperscript{20} See Article 5.2.2.7 ISL 2009.

NB: The minimum retention time has been extended to 6 months as per Article 5.3.11.1 of the 2021 ISL.
C. Intricate Sample Collection Process

80. The ITA investigation faced issues with its fact-finding quest due to the ADAMS reporting system for AAFs, but also found that the IWF exploited this loophole to deceive WADA.

81. When a sample is provided by an athlete, the doping control form (“DCF”)\(^{21}\) records the key information about the sample, including the identity of the athlete, the type of test (in-competition or out-of-competition) and the testing authority (“TA”), the results management authority (“RMA”) and the sample collection authority (“SCA”) for the sample.

82. Whilst the responsibilities of the TA, RMA and SCA are clearly defined by the Code and applicable International Standards\(^{22}\), the identification of the competent bodies on the DCF, which is filled out manually by the doping control officer (“DCO”),\(^{23}\) may be inaccurate, which triggers issues with the follow-up and subsequent prosecution.

83. When an athlete’s sample is sent to a Laboratory for analysis, a redacted DCF is provided to the Laboratory to ensure the analytical work is undertaken without bias. Therefore, when a Laboratory reports the analysis results (including an AAF), the only common reference between all stakeholders is the sample code. It is only once the TA matches the DCF information with the laboratory report in ADAMS that the AAF is linked to the athlete and that WADA becomes aware of the identity of the athlete.

84. Up until the introduction of the 2015 Code on 1 January 2015, the use of ADAMS was not mandatory for Anti-Doping Organisations (“ADOs”).\(^{24}\) WADA made the recording of DCFs into ADAMS within 15 business days after sample collection compulsory on 1 June 2016.\(^{25}\)

85. For the vast majority of samples on the WADA List, the DCF, and hence the athlete’s identity, had not been matched in ADAMS by the IWF or other responsible TA. The only information available to WADA (and the ITA) was the laboratory result contained in ADAMS, with limited information.

\(^{21}\) The DCF was a paper document during the period relevant for this investigation (2009-2019). This document was sent to the testing authority, with a copy to the results management authority and the sample collection agency if those were not the same entity. The athlete was also given a copy as well.


See Definition of RMA – International Standard for Results Management (ISRM), version 2021: “The Anti-Doping Organization responsible for conducting Results Management in a given case.”

See Definition of SCA – ISTI, version 2021: “The Organization that is responsible for the collection of Samples.”

This may be the TA itself, but more often these are National Anti-Doping Organisations or private services providers. As documented in the McLaren Report on the IWF (see pg. 28), HUNADO acted as the SCA on behalf of the IWF for a majority of IWF testing.

There are some exceptions to the allocation of responsibilities set forth in the Code, such as when a NADO does not have results management authority over an Athlete and must delegate the follow-up for an AAF to the International Federation.

\(^{23}\) NB: Paperless systems for DCF are currently replacing the paper system and this may cure this issue.


NB: 2021 ISTI: 4.9.1. b) [ADO] shall: b) “within twenty-one (21) days of Sample collection, enter the Doping Control form into ADAMS for all Samples collected.”
86. The ITA’s investigation found evidence that in some instances the IWF deliberately avoided matching DCFs with sample codes so as to purposely omit to link the AAFs to the athlete in ADAMS, with a view to circumvent WADA’s scrutiny.

87. The ITA investigation revealed years of inadequate results management oversight by the IWF, which was exacerbated by the constraints faced by WADA to hold the IWF to account for its failure to provide timely, accurate information and corresponding documentation regarding doping sanctions. This led the IWF, through its President Mr Tamás Aján, to adopt the stance that the IWF could simply ignore WADA’s repeated requests to be provided with doping sanction information in a timely and accurate manner.

D. Statute of Limitation

88. Under the Code\textsuperscript{26}, an ADRV is time-barred if not pursued within ten years from the date of the ADRV, and the key milestone that interrupts the running of the limitation period is the notification of the ADRV to the athlete or other incriminated individual (or reasonable attempt to notify the party). In other words, if the athlete is informed of the ADRV by the ADO and results management is thus initiated within the ten-year period, the statute of limitations will not prevent a case from going forward even if it takes years to complete the proceedings.

89. Similar to the constraint of discarded laboratory reports, for many cases in the WADA List, as detailed below, the fact that the athletes were not informed of the AAF within the ten-year period meant that, due to the statute of limitation, the ITA was unable to save the cases.

5. INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS

5.1. PENDING ADRVS: BREAKDOWN & KEY FINDINGS

90. On a rather technical note, the WADA List of 18 August 2020 referred to 142 “pending cases”, while 4 additional cases were added by WADA subsequently. With the exception of 4 cases, all the ADRVs were based on AAFs. The exact number of pending cases fluctuates depending on whether the base of the calculation is the number of AAFs or the number of ADRVs, insofar as numerous AAFs may be considered as one single ADRV depending on the circumstances. For ease of reference, this report refers to “cases”, which may cover more than one sample or AAF.\textsuperscript{27}

\textsuperscript{26} See Article 17 – Statute of Limitations (Code 2015, 2021; applies retroactively to the 2009 Code to cases which were not time-barred by 1 January 2015).

\textsuperscript{27} In addition, there were two duplicates in the WADA List and two codes in fact referred to the same sample (the sample number and the sample laboratory code were listed as two distinct cases). All this means that the numbers of files mentioned in this report may not add up to 146, technically speaking.
91. The breakdown of the WADA List is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2019</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

92. The ITA provided preliminary status updates on the progress of these matters to WADA on 18 September 2020, 3 November 2020, 19 February 2021 and 20 May 2021. These reports were accompanied by more than 300 pages providing detailed information on every single case.

93. Considering the scarce and scattered information available as described above, the ITA had to turn to the stakeholders to obtain information on the pending cases:

1. **Laboratories**, who reconstructed laboratory reports (when no longer available in ADAMS), provided information on the status of samples and, on a handful of occasions, produced limited correspondence with the IWF or ADO;

2. **the SCA**, who provided DCFs where these were not available in ADAMS or IWF Records;

3. **various IWF Member Federations and National Anti-Doping Organisations (“NADOs”),** who provided parts of results management files or miscellaneous pieces of information about the cases;

4. **The IWF’s own recordkeeping and communications.**

94. This broad enquiry enabled the ITA to reconstruct case files, assess the ADRVs, reach a conclusion for a large majority of the cases and detect additional ADRVs, as will be explained below.

95. After review, 67 cases had in fact been properly resolved by the IWF or the other entities responsible for results management. WADA had not necessarily been informed of the resolution of the cases by the IWF or other entities. The ITA has obtained copies of the decisions and provided them to WADA. The ITA further double-checked whether the IWF sanctions had been effectively implemented, which was the case.

96. 6 cases were not under the IWF’s jurisdiction after all, but rather fell under the authority of various ADOs. The ITA was able to recover information about all these cases, and this has been passed on to WADA for follow-up with the competent ADO.

97. Moreover, the WADA List included 23 cases, mainly arising from 2019, that have been instigated by the ITA directly as per the IWF’s general delegation of results management activities. There were no unreasonable delays in the handling of these cases or other specific issues; they were simply included in the WADA List because the reference period for all pending matters was 31 December 2019. These cases are a part of the ITA’s “standard”
caseload for the IWF, which adds up to 121 potential ADRVs processed since the delegation of results management activity by the IWF to the ITA in June 2019, as will be further detailed below.

98. After further investigation, the ITA also found that 5 cases could not be considered as ADRVs after all.28

99. The ITA was able to instigate or resume the process for 12 cases.29

100. This thus leaves 29 cases that were in fact unprocessed by the IWF or its Member Federations.30

101. The reasons why these files were unprocessed and for the variation in numbers across the years are multiple: ranging from what appears to be mere administrative oversight due to poor organisation skills, to jurisdictional mix-up, to passivity, and on to blatant cover-up.

102. For many cases, whilst there is evidence that the IWF was clearly aware of the AAF in a timely fashion, the ITA was not able to identify any record or indication as to why the ADRVs were not brought forward.

103. Based on the data review of IWF Records conducted by the ITA, the IWF’s management of data and information pertaining to anti-doping was chaotic at best, with no centralised control, no audit trails, no comprehensive database, and no case management systems in place.

104. Results management of ADRVs was usually handled by one legal counsel at the IWF. This legal counsel was appointed “Anti-Doping Coordinator” and oversaw other aspects of the anti-doping program, such as testing. Over the 2009-2019 period, three legal counsels were hired one after the other, with some overlapping periods. Ms Monika Ungar was in charge from around 2005 until around 31 January 2014, when she left the IWF for maternity leave. Ms Magdolna Trombitas, who had been at the IWF since September 2012 but not directly involved in results management until later, took over from Ms Ungar on around 1 February 2014, and she continued in this role until around 16 September 2016, when she left the IWF for maternity leave. Thereafter Ms Eva Nyírfa, who had been junior legal counsel at the IWF since 2015, took over the role of Anti-Doping Coordinator from 2016 to December 2018, when she resigned from the IWF. However, she continued to work at the IWF until February 2019 to facilitate the transition to a new IWF legal counsel, Ms Lilla Sagi.31

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28 For further details on these cases, please refer to Appendix 1 to this report.
29 For further details on these cases, please refer to Appendix 1 to this report.
30 For further details on these cases, please refer to Appendix 1 to this report.
31 One could wonder why Ms Trombitas did not take over her predecessor’s caseload and in turn Ms. Nyírfa. Ms Ungar has confirmed to Prof. McLaren that she had not properly handed over her files to Ms Trombitas when leaving the IWF. As conveyed by Ms Trombitas and Ms Nyírfa during their interview with Prof. McLaren and subsequently with the ITA, carrying out their daily tasks and contemporaneous caseload was already enough of a challenge due to the allegedly erratic and dictatorial leadership of Mr Aján. In hindsight and taking into consideration the circumstances described by the McLaren Report on IWF on the toxic environment at the IWF, one may find that it would have been unrealistic to expect Ms Ungar’s successors to take it upon themselves to dig into past cases.
105. The disordertly system, especially during the years 2009-2014, contributed greatly to IWF’s shortcomings in terms of results management.

106. In other instances, the ITA investigation found evidence of administrative neglect or cover-up, as detailed below.

5.2. WADA’S FOLLOW-UP WITH THE IWF ON PENDING CASES AND THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK

107. WADA was notified of all AAFs by the relevant Laboratories. As per the IWF’s records, at least 20 emails or letters including a list of the pending cases were sent to the IWF since 2010, and over 350 automatic email notifications were sent for individual cases from 2013-2016. For the technical reasons explained above, WADA was not automatically aware of the athlete’s identity for the vast majority of cases. Via ADAMS, WADA was aware of the positive result, the date of the test, the prohibited substance involved and that it was in the sport of weightlifting.

108. In relation to the means of intervention, where proceedings are unreasonably prolonged, WADA has the authority to step in and take a case directly to the Court of Arbitration for Sport ("CAS"). This applied to IWF cases and Member Federation cases. However, the ITA notes that there exists a number of practical and legal constraints to appeal a decision of no anti-doping rule violation to CAS without the identity of the athlete.

109. The International Standard for Code Compliance by Signatories, in force since 1 April 2018, provides the basis for legal consequences for compliance issues.

110. Before that, the 2009 and 2015 Code (in force until 31 December 2020) set forth general provisions with regards to monitoring where International Federations were expected to report to WADA on their own compliance and failure to provide this information could be considered as non-compliance with the Code. Under these rules, IF non-compliance could trigger consequences such as forfeiture of offices and positions within WADA, symbolic consequences and other consequences pursuant to the Olympic Charter.

5.3. PENDING ADRVs: OUTCOMES

A. “Lost cases”: ADRVs not sanctioned

111. 29 cases not brought forward by the IWF or the Member Federations were ultimately not sanctioned and could not be salvaged by the ITA due to statute of limitations issues, since the athletes were never informed of the AAF within the ten-year period and/or unavailability of evidence.

32 See Article 13.3 of the 2009, 2015 and 2021 Code (IWF cases), and Article 13.3 of the 2009 IWF ADR.
33 See Articles 23.4.1 to 23.5 of the 2009 and 2015 Code.
34 For the sake of clarity, the ITA can confirm that, to the extent the ITA was able to identify the athlete, none the athletes are scheduled to compete in the upcoming Tokyo 2020 Olympic Games.
112. What is more, even if those cases had not become time-barred, the A sample and B sample had already been discarded by the Laboratories years ago in most cases due to the 3-month retention period of samples.

113. It has been a crucial step in the ITA’s investigation to contact the respective Laboratories to ascertain the availability of samples.

114. For the majority of cases at hand, it appears that the Laboratories had not destroyed the samples immediately after the 3-month minimum retention period, but had done so a few years later since they had never heard back from the IWF.

115. The athlete’s right to ask for the counter-analysis of their B sample is fundamental in a case involving the presence of a prohibited substance (Article 2.1). Considering that the A and B samples were no longer available when the ITA was instructed to resolve these cases, it was impossible to proceed with a case where an athlete could not be afforded their right to B-sample testing.35

116. As required by the Code and the International Standard for Results Management (Article 5.4), the ITA issued “reasoned decisions” for not going forward on behalf of the IWF for each of those 29 cases, providing the details of the case and the legal grounds for the decision to close the matter. The parties with a right to appeal under Article 13 of the Code, that is WADA and the relevant NADO, were notified of each decision and received the key documents from the case file. As of date, WADA and the relevant NADO have not appealed any decisions issued by the ITA and the deadline to do so has lapsed for the majority of the cases.

117. The breakdown of those “Lost Cases” under the TA or RMA of the IWF or the Member Federation can be found in Appendix 1.

B. Member Federations Jurisdiction Issue

118. 16 of the “Lost Cases” stemmed from testing conducted under the authority of the Member Federations and not the IWF directly.

119. Up until 1 January 2015, the Member Federations had the power to carry out doping controls on their athletes under their own authority and were responsible for the results management of any AAFs ensuing from such doping controls.36

120. These testing prerogatives on the part of the Member Federations were removed with the introduction of the new 2015 Code and the implementation of the revised 2015 IWF ADR

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35  For the sake of clarity, the ITA is mindful that in some instances, an ADRV for Use (Article 2.2) may be pursued based on analytical data from an A-sample (without confirmation from an analysis of a B-sample), but as stated by CAS the A-sample cannot by itself be sufficient to establish “Use”, see CAS 2016/A/4828; CAS 2010/A/2161; CAS 2015/A/3977). As confirmed by CAS, the “Use” ADRV must be corroborated by other reliable means. In this regard, the ITA carefully reviewed each case file and sought to obtain corroborative evidence, without success. There was no information to substantiate the ADRV mainly because of the cases dated back more than a decade and that the Athlete Biological Passport (steroidal module) did not exist before 1 January 2014. See ABP steroidal module in force since 1 January 2014 - https://www.wada-ama.org/en/questions-answers/athlete-biological-passport-steroidal-module.

36  See Articles 5.1 and 7.4 of the IWF ADR 2009.
insofar as, under the Code, only ADOs, namely Major Event Organizations, International Federations and NADOs, can act as the TA.37

121. The ITA did not obtain the global figures pertaining to the Member Federations' testing and sanctions over the period from 2009 to 2015. The ITA is therefore not in a position to provide a comprehensive overview of the effectiveness of the Member Federations’ anti-doping program generally speaking.

122. The outcomes of the Member Federations’ cases included in the WADA List can be found in Appendix I.

123. Whilst these Member Federations’ cases were not under the direct authority of the IWF, the IWF had the ability, with effect from the introduction of the new 2015 IWF ADR on 1 January 2015, to take over the results management of Member Federation cases where the proceedings were protracted.38

124. Similarly, WADA also had the ability to step in when an IWF Member Federation failed to render a decision within a reasonable deadline by taking the case directly to CAS.39

125. Based on the ITA’s review of the abovementioned Member Federation caseload, it appears that the IWF did not attempt to take over the results management of the Member Federation cases and instead only asked the Member Federation for updates on these cases when WADA reminded the IWF about pending matters. These are examples of why the ITA has found that some cases could not be properly sanctioned due to passivity on the IWF’s part.

C. Thai Amateur Weightlifting Federation (“TAWA”)

126. In the WADA List, 7 AAFs for anabolic steroids collected under the TA of TAWA were listed as “pending”: one AAF from 2010 and 6 AAFs from 2011.

127. Upon inquiry, TAWA provided the ITA with TAWA’s decision for all 7 athletes, which stated that the athletes had been properly sanctioned.

128. While *prima facie* the sanctions were in compliance with the Code and the IWF ADR, taking into consideration the numerous ADRVs for TAWA athletes40 over the past decade and that the ARD Documentary had pointed to a widespread culture of doping in weightlifting in

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37 The 2021 Code has further clarified that areas of compliance for International Federations include “requiring that their National Federations conduct Testing only under the documented authority of their International Federation and use their NADO or other Sample collection authority to collect Samples in compliance with the International Standard for Testing and Investigation ("ISTI").”

38 See Article 13.3.1 of the 2015 IWF ADR.

39 See Article 13.3 of the 2009, 2015 and 2021 Code (IWF cases), and Article 13.3 of the IWF ADR that applied from 1 January 2009 to 31 December 2014. However, the ITA notes that there exists a number of practical and legal constraints to appeal a decision of no anti-doping rule violation to CAS without the identity of the athlete.

40 In 2011, 7 TAWA athletes were sanctioned by the IWF with a period of ineligibility of two years and a fine was imposed on TAWA under Article 12.3 of the 2009 IWF ADR. In 2018, 9 TAWA athletes tested positive for anabolic steroids at the 2018 IWF World Championships and 1 TAWA athlete tested positive at the 2018 Youth Olympic Games. As a consequence of the multiple AAFs, TAWA was once again sanctioned under Article 12 the IWF ADR and no TAWA athlete will be allowed to participate in the 2020 Tokyo Olympic Games.
Thailand, the ITA investigated the matter further. The findings of the ITA’s investigation are as follows.

129. Between 2011 and 2012, it appears that 93 TAWA athletes tested positive for anabolic steroids. TAWA stated that the athletes who tested positive belonged to provincial clubs and the large number of cases were a result of an initiative taken by TAWA and the Sports Authority of Thailand to “get rid of or to minimize positives cases of weightlifting in Thailand”.42

130. In 2015, upon inquiry by WADA, TAWA provided the IWF with an Excel spreadsheet containing the names and sanctions imposed on 85 athletes (18 male, 67 female). This document indicated that the athletes were sanctioned with a period of ineligibility of two years each. Based on the IWF Records reviewed by the ITA, these numbers did not alarm the IWF, nor trigger any reaction. In hindsight, the ITA finds that the recurrence of waves of ADRVs in Thai weightlifting speaks to the nonchalance of the IWF to the systemic issue of the prevalence of doping in some regions.

D. The Egyptian Weightlifting Federation (“EWF”)

131. The 2009-2010 period appears to have been problematic for weightlifting in Egypt. 11 of the “Lost Cases” stemmed from testing conducted by the EWF. When contacted by the ITA in connection with its inquiries, the EWF explained that the current EWF administration was not involved back then and that archives were lost during the civil uprising that took place in Egypt around the same period, so no conclusion could be drawn on those cases.

132. It must be said, however, that with the assistance of the ITA the EWF resumed results management for 3 AAFs from 2011, since there were no statute of limitations issues and the B samples were still available. The EWF has since sanctioned the athletes involved with the applicable period of ineligibility.

133. Considering that the EWF was sanctioned under Article 12 following the return of 7 ADRVs from its athletes during a training camp in 2016 and that there are 6 pending AAFs from 2019 currently being handled by the ITA, the ITA finds that here again is an example of where the IWF was aware of doping issues in a country and the IWF’s indifference contributed to the story repeating itself.

41 The breakdown of the 93 cases is 66 cases in 2011 and 27 in 2012.
42 Out of the 93 athletes sanctioned by TAWA, the ITA was able to identify 10 athletes. For the sake of clarity, the ITA is not alleging that the remaining 83 athletes do not exist, but given the complexities with the names (in Thai as translated to English), the ITA was unable to verify their identities. Out of the 10 athletes identified by the ITA, the ITA discovered that four athletes continued to compete in national events and one athlete competed in IWF events during their period of Ineligibility. In light of the above, the ITA cannot comment on whether the sanctions imposed on the 93 athletes were complied with.
43 As per the information available to the ITA, no sanctioning decision was provided by TAWA to the IWF but instead the sanctions were detailed on an Excel sheet.
E. Pending cases resumed by the ITA

134. The ITA was in a position to start or resume results management for 12 cases.44

135. This was feasible for many reasons, such as the fact that the IWF had informed the athlete of the AAF in due time but did not complete the results management and disciplinary process, or the IWF had provided the athlete with the opportunity to exert his or her B-sample right or the B sample still existed. In such instances, the ITA was able to resume results management based on reconstructed information. Some cases have been finalised and sanctions have been imposed; others are still ongoing.

6. ADRVs RELATING TO COMPLICITY & TAMPERING BY IWF AND MEMBER FEDERATIONS’ OFFICIALS UNCOVERED WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE ITA’S INVESTIGATION

136. In connection with its investigations into the WADA List, the ITA identified substantial and strong evidence of several ADRVs having been committed by current and former high-ranking officials within the IWF and certain Member Federations.

137. As explained in the preliminary remarks to this report, the ITA’s clear mandate, on behalf of the IWF, is to “vigorously pursue all potential ADRV within [its] authority, including investigation into whether Athlete Support Personnel or other Persons may have been involved in each case of doping”.

138. In light of the foregoing, the ITA has asserted ADRVs against several current and former high-ranking officials within the IWF and certain Member Federations in relations to the facts set out below. The individuals have been informed of the charges on 23 June 2021.

6.1. COVER-UP TO ALLOW A DOPED ATHLETE TO PARTICIPATE AND WIN A MEDAL AT THE LONDON OLYMPIC GAMES

139. During the course of its investigation, the ITA uncovered a case included in the WADA List with troubling ramifications of a cover-up at the highest levels of the IWF and that related to the most coveted event, the Olympic Games.

140. Based on the WADA List, the Romanian athlete, Roxana Cocos, had a pending AAF for anabolic steroids dating from 13 April 2012 from the 2012 European Championships in Antalya, Turkey,45 where she placed second.

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44 For further details on these cases, please refer to Appendix 1 to this report.
45 As explained in the section 4.4, WADA was not aware of the athlete’s identity; only the AAF.
141. The ITA investigation immediately found this suspicious, considering that Ms Cocos participated in the London Games and won a silver medal.

142. By digging into the files, the ITA investigation found that on 10 May 2012 the IWF had initially informed the President of the Weightlifting Federation of Romania ("FRH"), Mr Nicolae Vlad, who was the IWF Vice-President and IWF Anti-Doping Chairman at the time, and Ms Cocos of the AAF related to the analysis of the European Championships Sample. The IWF informed Mr Vlad and Ms Cocos that she was immediately suspended “from any weightlifting activity” and that the provisional suspension was to remain “in force until all applicable procedures have been completed”. Moreover, the IWF also informed Mr Vlad that the “IWF does everything on its behalf to expedite the procedure due to the closeness of the London Games” and asked him to “respond within the set deadlines and take the necessary action”.

143. The ITA investigation was not able to identify any reply to this notification in the IWF files provided to the ITA. That said, from previous ADRVs involving Romanian athletes, the ITA found that Mr Vlad usually responded to the IWF personally about results management considerations on behalf of FRH athletes, and from the same email address used to notify Mr Vlad of the Cocos case.

144. According to internal IWF documents and correspondence, in the weeks after being informed of the positive case, IWF staff were made aware that the Romanian National Olympic Committee ("NOC") included Ms Cocos on the pre-London Games list of athletes to be tested prior to the Games.

145. Furthermore, the IWF had suspected Ms Cocos for possible manipulation of urine samples in July and September 2010, and ordered the DNA of both samples to be compared for suspicion of manipulation.

146. On 20 July 2012, the Athlete Passport Management Unit ("APMU") in Cologne in charge of the IWF Athlete Biological Passport program informed the IWF that it was in a position to prove manipulation in relation to samples collected from Ms Cocos and that the APMU would soon be providing the IWF with written documentation confirming the manipulation.

147. On the very same day, Mr Aján sent an email to Mr Vlad informing him that “[w]e have just received information that the laboratory detected the manipulation of the urine samples of Ms. Roxana Cocos. It means the DNA analysis of her samples prove that some of her samples were provided by someone else!”

148. Mr Aján then informed Mr Vlad that “[b]ased on the above and to try and avoid any scandals right before the London Olympic Games I suggest that you reconsider this athlete’s nomination to the Games. There will be many tests in London as well and those controls are carried out by the IOC and they will release all information immediately”.

149. On 24 July 2012, the APMU provided the written DNA profile analysis report to the IWF which confirmed, amongst other things, that the DNA from samples collected out-of-competition in 2010 and in June 2012 did not match the DNA of the samples collected in-competition during
the 2010 World Championships and the 2012 European Championships. In other words, a “doppelgänger” provided the samples on behalf of Ms Cocos during the out-of-competition testing missions.

150. On the same day, the IWF notified Mr Vlad and the athlete of “the proof of manipulation by your lifter Ms. Roxana Cocos”. The IWF further asked Mr Vlad to “[p]lease consider her as provisionally suspended from today, the 24th July 2012. Therefore she shall be withdrawn from the 2012 London Olympic Games and replaced by someone else”.

151. Again, no reply to this email was uncovered by the ITA investigation based on the information in our possession.

152. Ms Cocos, however, went on to win a medal at the London Games, whilst she was provisionally suspended twice.

153. The ITA investigation has strong reasons to think that the IWF and Mr Vlad were fully aware that, as long as the IWF did not manually match Ms Cocos’ AAF sample to her profile in ADAMS, the case could be concealed.

154. Ms Cocos’ ADRVs were not pursued by the IWF. Ms Cocos did not participate in IWF events after the London Games.

155. Pursuant to the re-analysis program launched by the IOC in 2016 for the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games and the London Games, which was completed by the ITA in 2020, we now know that the entire FRH delegation at the London Games was doping, since the 4 FRH weightlifters, Ms Cocos included, returned AAFs for multiple anabolic steroids.46

156. Pursuant to Article 2.8 of the IWF ADR: “assisting, encouraging, aiding, abetting, covering up or any other type of complicity involving an anti-doping rule or any attempted anti-doping rule violation” shall be considered an ADRV.

157. The President of the IWF and the President of the FHR both committed intentional acts or omissions so as to allow Ms Cocos, an athlete who had been twice provisionally suspended by the IWF, first for an AAF for an anabolic steroid and second for the use of the prohibited method of urine substitution, to nevertheless participate in the London Olympic Games, a competition in which she won the silver medal and for which she was subsequently disqualified after it came to light that she was, still at that time, positive for metabolites of prohibited anabolic steroids.

158. By intentionally failing to implement Ms Cocos’ provisional suspension, the two IWF officials allowed one of Romania’s top-ranked international athletes to participate in the London Games.

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On 23 November 2020, Ms Cocos was found by the IOC Disciplinary Commission to have committed an ADRV pursuant to the IOC Anti-Doping Rules and was disqualified from the 2012 Olympic Games event in which she participated and was ordered to return the silver medal, diploma and pin she had obtained.
Games despite clear and undisputed evidence of her having resorted to urine substitution and having used anabolic steroids in the lead-up to the Olympic Games.

159. In light of the foregoing, the ITA asserted ADRVs against Mr Tamás Aján and Mr Nicolae Vlad for tampering and complicity (Article 2.5 and 2.8 of the IWF ADR) in the multiple ADRVs committed by Ms Cocos.

160. The ITA has also resumed the case against Ms Cocos. She has been informed of her corresponding rights.

6.2. COMPLICITY IN RELATION TO ADRVS COMMITTED BY SEVERAL AZERBAIJANI WEIGHTLIFTERS IN THE YEAR 2013

161. As initially uncovered by ARD and broadcast in the ARD Documentary and then partially substantiated in the McLaren Report on the IWF – between Mr Aján and the Azerbaijan Weightlifting Federation (“AWF”) to cover-up multiple ADRVs pertaining to Azerbaijani athletes in 2013 and 2014.

162. Briefly put, the ITA investigation has found that the conspiracy did indeed take place.

163. In the year 2013, several Azerbaijani weightlifters tested positive during both in-competition and out-of-competition, IWF-led testing missions. In total, more than 23 samples provided by 18 Azerbaijani lifters between April and September 2013 were found to be positive.

164. On 3 October 2013, the Executive Director of the AWF submitted to the IWF its list of participating athletes for the 2013 IWF World Weightlifting Championships (“2013 IWF WWC”). The list the name of three Azerbaijani weightlifters whose samples had tested positive over the prior months, positives of which the IWF had been informed.

165. On 9 October 2013, Mr Aján sent an email to the AWF Executive Director instructing him to organise a testing mission with the local anti-doping agency and to send the samples to a laboratory different than the one used by the IWF at that time. Mr Aján further instructed the AWF to insist on obtaining the results of these tests no later than 16 October 2016, i.e. the starting date of the 2013 IWF WWC.

166. On 11 October 2013, Mr Aján wrote an official letter to the president of the AWF informing him that “the total number [of positive samples collected from Azerbaijani weightlifters] for this year is 23”. Mr Aján further informed the AWF president that “I cannot take any responsibility or accept such serious violation of the IWF Anti-Doping rules and the objectives of our sport. This is clearly a moral massacre regarding the athletes. […] Now I know that it was a terrible mistake when earlier this year I did not insist on the application of stricter sanctions on your lifters and coaches. […] The mentioned cases will not yet be published but I can no longer take the responsibility in front of the WADA and the IOC for your federation.”47

47 This letter was first published in the article “FBI and Swiss Police dig into the weightlifting scandal, while IOC is undecided” by Grit Hartmann and Nick Butler, posted on Play the Game on 12 November 2020.
167. The three Azerbaijani weightlifters whose samples tested positive over the preceding months nevertheless competed in the 2013 IWF WWC.

168. On 3 December 2013, the AWF submitted to the IWF the final entry list for the 2013 IWF Grand Prix & 2nd Baku International Cup (the “2013 Baku Cup”), scheduled to take place from 5-8 December 2013. The list included the names of eight Azerbaijani weightlifters whose samples had returned AAFs in the preceding months, of which the IWF had been informed. Seven of these athletes competed in the 2013 Baku Cup.

169. On 10 December 2013, i.e. a few days after the 2013 Baku Cup, Mr Aján sent an official letter to the president of the AWF which read, in part, as follows:

− “I wish to inform you in confidentially of the following [...] Kindly ask you to treat this letter with utmost discretion since the subject we have to discuss is very sensitive and needs careful consideration.”

− “In 2013, there were 23 positive cases among your athletes related to 18 athletes, whereas 5 athletes are concerned twice.”

− “This important issue is not only a concern for the IWF Secretariat but also WADA is aware of the samples, without name and nationality. The IWF however shall report to WADA to name, country and sanction related to each sample code number. There is a standardized control system for the entire sport world therefore there is no way for the IWF to cover up these cases.”

− “What we have done for your athletes and Federation is something the IWF has never done before and not willing or able to do in the future. The knot tightens around my neck and my 45 years work could go down in a blink.”

− “The IWF keeps receiving reminders from WADA related to all 23 cases and sooner or later an answer shall be given. Dear Friend, From the 1st January of next year the IWF will not be able to assist in any such or similar matters.”

− “At the moment my biggest concern is when and what the IWF shall report to WADA related to the 23 cases and what names will be listed behind the cases. Since we have received two warnings from WADA already, I am only able to postpone this matter until the end of this year and I need to provide some answers.”

− “Kindly ask you to have this letter translated for you […] and following delete it from your emails and destroy it completely.”

170. On 19 March 2014, the IWF published a press release claiming that “[t]he relevant procedures of anti-doping violations by multiple weightlifters from Azerbaijan have now been closed. Accordingly, lifters found positive at the 2013 European Championships and subsequently in out-of-competition testing have been sanctioned”.

171. On 11 April 2014, the IWF sent several emails to WADA containing 18 documents dated from 4 June 2013 to 18 November 2013 and which were said to be both notifications and

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48 This letter was also first published in the article “FBI and Swiss Police dig into the weightlifting scandal, while IOC is undecided” by Grit Hartmann and Nick Butler, posted on Play the Game on 12 November 2020.
sanctioning decisions related to the 23 positive samples provided in 2013 by the Azerbaijani weightlifters.

172. However, as a result of its investigation, the ITA has every reason to believe that the Azerbaijani decisions were in fact backdated to have it appear that the 23 positives had been timely notified and sanctioned by the IWF when in fact these documents were created and subsequently backdated to lead WADA astray. In other words, and contrary to the contents of the Azerbaijani decisions, the Azerbaijani weightlifters had not been sanctioned in 2013. This is also substantiated by the fact that some of the athletes participated in IWF events when, based on the alleged decisions, they would have been sanctioned at the time.

173. The ITA investigation thus showed that Mr Aján intentionally allowed and implemented the cover-up of 23 ADRVs committed by Azerbaijani weightlifters during the year 2013, thus allowing multiple athletes with previous and unprocessed ADRVs to participate in the 2013 IWF World Championships and the 2013 Baku Cup although these results were subsequently disqualified.

174. The ITA investigation also found that Mr Aján gave specific instructions to the AWF on how to conduct out-of-competition testing on its athletes to make sure that the AWF lifters would not test positive during IWF competitions and that the potential AAFs from the “wash-out” mission would not be tracked in the IWF’s records.

175. In addition, the ITA has every reason to believe that the sanctions that were ultimately issued by the IWF were artificially and purposely backdated to give WADA the impression that the ADRVs had been sanctioned in a timely manner.

176. Finally, the ITA investigation confirmed the allegations of Mr Aján’s favouritism towards the AWF. By way of example, the ITA investigation uncovered that, as part of the London Games, Mr Aján extended an invitation to the AWF President to be Mr Aján’s personal guest for an all-expenses paid trip for the entire duration of the Games. The IWF also provided the AWF President with a luxury suite at the Millennium Hotel Mayfair at a rate of £1358.64 per night and a cost to the IWF of approximately £30,000 for the duration of the London Games. It should be noted that the AWF President’s suite is the only luxury suite that the IWF paid for during the London Games.

177. It appears that this favouritism was also at play when Mr Aján intentionally allowed and implemented the cover-up of 23 ADRVs committed by Azerbaijani weightlifters during the year 2013.

178. In light of the foregoing, the ITA has charged Mr Aján with several ADRVs for tampering and complicity (Article 2.5 and 2.8 of the IWF ADR) involving the multiple ADRVs committed by the Azerbaijani weightlifters. Mr Aján has been notified of his corresponding rights on 23 June 2021.
6.3. COMPLICITY WITH REGARD TO UNSANCTIONED ADRVs COMMITTED BY IWF ATHLETES PRIOR TO THE YEAR 2014

179. Over the years, WADA repeatedly made inquiries with the IWF as to the status of cases which were still pending in its files, be it through automatic reminders or official letters.

180. The ITA investigation confirmed that Mr Aján obstructed WADA’s inquiries into pending cases for AAFs which occurred prior to the year 2014 by deliberately not inquiring into their potential resolution, by deliberately not following up on WADA’s correspondence or by providing WADA with purposely incomplete information and by intentionally not instructing IWF personnel to process these ADRVs.

181. As explained above, the findings of the ITA investigation confirm that 30 cases for which the IWF was the Results Management Authority remained unprocessed from 2009 to 2016. In addition, 29 cases could not be processed at all, either due to their respective statute of limitations or to samples having been discarded by Laboratories.

182. In light of the foregoing, the ITA has charged Mr Aján with an ADRV of tampering and complicity (Article 2.5 and Article 2.8 of the IWF ADR) in the multiple unsanctioned ADRVs committed by IWF athletes prior to the year 2014 and which the ITA, on behalf of the IWF, was unable to process.

6.4. TAMPERING TO AVOID ARTICLE 12 CONSEQUENCES FOR THE TURKEY WEIGHTLIFTING FEDERATION (“TWF”)

183. The McLaren Report on the IWF raised allegations of "Missing Positive Results which potentially remained unresolved", including in relation to samples collected from athletes affiliated with the TWF in the year 2012, and issues around the jurisdiction of those cases.49

184. The ITA investigated this allegation further and can confirm that, in 2012, the former President of the TWF, Mr Hasan Akkus ("Mr Akkus"), currently President of the European Weightlifting Confederation, devised a scheme whereby (a) the RMA for AAFs collected from 17 Turkish athletes in November/December 2012 was retrospectively transferred to the TWF, and (b) backdated documents were falsely created to make it seem as if the AAFs stemmed from testing missions conducted by the TWF and not the IWF. The ITA considers that this was done so as to avoid the TWF and its officials from being sanctioned by the IWF under Article 12.3 of the IWF ADR for up to 4 years and to avoid payment of a fine for multiple ADRVs committed by TWF athletes. This is detailed below.

185. On 10 November 2012 and 17 November 2012, unannounced out-of-competition doping control testing missions were carried out in Ovacik, Turkey ("the Ovacik Missions"). The purpose of the missions was to test Turkish athletes prior to the U-23/Junior Championships in Eilat, Israel ("the Eilat Championships"). It is evident that the TA and RMA for the Ovacik Missions was the IWF.

49 See McLaren Report on the IWF, pages 108 to 112.
186. On 7 December 2012, the laboratory reported AAFs for anabolic steroids in 16 out of the 20 samples collected during the Ovacik Missions.

187. Testing was also conducted under the TA and RMA of the IWF during the Eliat Championships ("the Eliat Mission"). On 10 January 2013, the laboratory reported AAFs for anabolic steroids in samples collected from 5 Turkish athletes by the Eliat Mission.50

188. On 17 January 2013, Mr Akkus sent an email to the IWF, inter alia asking the IWF not to publish the results of the Ovacik Missions and the Eliat Mission and to allow the TWF (instead of the IWF) to sanction the 17 Athletes. Excerpts of the email are reproduced below:

> "Then I prepared the enclosed letter dated 05.11.2012. It means, out of competition tests were organized by Turkish WF with helping IWF on 10.11.2012 and 17.11.2012.

> So Turkish Weightlifting Federation gives penalty to the athletes their testing results are pozitif after out of competition tests which were organized on 10.11.2012 and 17.11.2012

> Last station is very heavy and bad for my federation and my self.

> Please ask to Mr Aján to help me.

> Please he doesn't publish WADA control results on the IWF web page. Of course WADA pozitif athletes are suspended and Mr Aján gives information to the WADA about their names and penalties.

> Please send us the documents electronicaly for pozitif cases then we start procedure here.

> I hope mr Aján and you can understand me help me."

> Please delete this e-mail after reading.

189. From the above email it is evident that, despite being aware that the Ovacik Missions and the Eliat Mission were missions conducted by the IWF, Mr Akkus nonetheless asked the IWF to (i) wrongfully state that the Ovacik Missions and the Eliat Mission were organized by the TWF, and (ii) not publish the results for the 17 Athletes on the IWF website.

190. Further, in order to be able to retrospectively transfer the TA/RMA of the 17 Athletes to the TWF, Mr Akkus created a false and backdated document dated 5 November 2012 to make it appear that the TWF had requested the IWF to conduct the Ovacik Missions on its behalf.

191. Eventually, via the TWF decisions dated July 2013, the 17 Athletes were each sanctioned with a period of ineligibility of two years. However, as these were TWF decisions (instead of being IWF decisions), the identity of the athletes was never released on the IWF website. More importantly, insofar as Member Federation AAFs are not taken into consideration for

50 Four athletes produced AAFs on both occasions i.e. the Ovacik Missions and the Eliat Mission. Therefore, the two missions produced 21 AAFs from 17 different athletes ("the 17 Athletes").
consequences imposed against the latter in the event of multiple ADRVs, the TWF avoided being sanctioned by the IWF under Article 12 of the IWF ADR at that time, thereby avoiding payment of a fine of up to USD 500,000.

192. It should also be noted that the sanctions eventually imposed on the 17 Athletes were thus national-level sanctions and the 17 Athletes remained, technically speaking, free to compete internationally.

193. In light of the foregoing, the ITA has charged Mr Akkus with an ADRV for tampering (Article 2.5 of the IWF ADR). Mr Akkus has been notified of his corresponding rights on 23 June 2021.

194. In addition, and in light of the ITA investigation’s findings that the TA and RMA for the tests conducted on the 17 Athletes should have remained with IWF, the ITA will also be launching corresponding proceedings against the TWF under Article 12.3 of the IWF ADR in connection with the multiple ADRVs committed by TWF athletes.

7. THE ITA’S CONTINUING EFFORTS TO CLEAN WEIGHTLIFTING: THE ITA’S CONTEMPORANEOUS CASELOAD

195. Since being tasked by the IWF with handling its anti-doping program in September 2019, and in parallel with the ITA’s work on the IWF’s past decade, the ITA has tirelessly investigated and pursued potential “current” ADRVs.

196. As of the date of this report, the ITA has in fact handled 121 potential ADRVs on behalf of the IWF pursuant to its delegation. Of these 121 potential cases, 97 cases have been brought forward as asserted ADRVs and 24 cases have been closed because they were not to be considered as ADRVs after all.52

197. The exhaustive list of the 97 ADRVs pursued by the ITA is enclosed as Appendix 2 to this report.

198. The ITA’s “current” affairs for the IWF include:

7.1. LIMS CASES

199. Based on investigations conducted by WADA’s Intelligence and Investigations Department (“WADA I&I”) and by Prof. McLaren into allegations of systemic doping practices in Russian sport, as well as Moscow Laboratory Information Management System (“LIMS”) data retrieved by WADA I&I over time, the ITA has asserted ADRVs against 20 Russian athletes. Of these 20

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51 As previously mentioned, this number includes the 23 cases which arose between 1 April 2018 and 31 December 2019 mentioned in the WADA List.

52 The reasons for not pursuing potential ADRVs include, amongst other things, the athletes having an existing Therapeutic Use Exemption and the case being compatible with potential meat contamination. WADA and the relevant NADO have always been informed of the ITA’s decisions not to proceed and have not appealed these decisions to CAS.
cases. 12 athletes have been sanctioned by the IWF Hearing Panel and 8 cases are still ongoing. The ITA is in the process of evaluating the data provided by WADA I&I in relation to other athletes, with a view to identifying whether the evidence is strong enough to pursue additional cases.

7.2. LONDON RE-ANALYSIS

200. Since the delegation of the IWF’s anti-doping program to the ITA in 2019, the ITA has also handled the results management of AAFs from the London Re-analysis program on behalf of the IWF. Out of a total of 36 weightlifters who tested positive through re-analysis of London Games samples, 12 cases were fully handled by the ITA and the athletes have been sanctioned accordingly. The other 24 cases arose prior to the delegation of the IWF program to the ITA and accordingly were handled by the IWF directly.

7.3. THE CASE OF THE RECORDED ADMISSION

201. The ARD Documentary included an interview with former Olympic weightlifter, Ms Rattikan (Siripuch) Gulnoi, member of TAWA, in which she made statements that suggested that she had used banned substances as part of her preparation for the London Games and throughout her career.

202. The ITA further investigated this potential ADRV on behalf of the IWF, and also on behalf of the IOC, insofar as the infraction could have a potential impact on the bronze medal obtained at the London Games.53

203. On 1 October 2020 the ITA charged the retired athlete with an ADRV for use of prohibited substances. The athlete is challenging the charge. If the prosecution is successful, the athlete’s results from 2011 to 2017 (when she retired) would be disqualified and a four-year ban would be imposed. The disciplinary proceedings are before the IWF Hearing Panel and are ongoing.

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IOC EB member Denis Oswald gave a report on the work of the Disciplinary Commission [DC] chaired by him that was set up to follow up on the doping confession by Rattikan Gulnoi, an Olympic bronze medalist from London 2012, and her entourage made to a TV programme by German broadcaster ARD.

The DC delegated the investigation of the case to the International Testing Agency (ITA), which is already responsible for selecting samples stored from past Olympic Games to be reanalysed.

The ITA then submitted a report of its investigation to the Commission.

The DC examined the elements provided in the ITA’s report and took the decision to close the file. The DC deemed that the case was not under the IOC’s authority as the athlete’s confession specifically excluded the periods of the Games.

The Disciplinary Commission noted that investigations on the same case currently being conducted by the ITA on behalf of the International Weightlifting Federation (IWF) may eventually lead to an impact on the athlete’s results at the Olympic Games. The IOC will therefore now wait for the outcomes of the ITA investigations for the IWF.
7.4. WADA OPERATION ARROW – USE OF DOPPELGÄNGERS TO PROVIDE CLEAN URINE AS MODUS OPERANDI

A. Background Information

204. On 14 December 2020, WADA I&I shared with the ITA the contents of its Operation Arrow investigation. As explained above, Operation Arrow’s focus was “the global practice of urine substitution by athletes and the use of doppelgängers within the sport of weightlifting”.

205. The issue of urine substitution was laid bare during the 2015 IWF World Weightlifting Championships in Houston, USA, where a total of 24 samples collected during the competition were tested positive, mostly for long-term metabolites of anabolic steroids. In other words, new and improved laboratory analysis methods showed that a significant proportion of the weightlifters tested during the 2015 IWF World Weightlifting Championships had been using anabolic steroids as part of their out-of-competition training without being detected.

206. This prompted WADA to investigate the use by athletes of so-called “urine substitution” at the time of sample collection for out-of-competition doping controls. In some cases, WADA was able to collect DNA from the athletes and to conduct DNA comparison analysis, which showed that the samples allegedly provided out-of-competition by several athletes had in fact been provided by “doppelgängers”. Due to the statutory retention times of samples, further DNA analysis could not be conducted as the samples had already been destroyed by the Laboratories in question.

207. It appears that, from 2016 onwards, athletes and Member Federations needed, and successfully managed, to change their doping protocols and/or resorted to new cover-up techniques. The ITA considers that this is most likely due to the new testing methods that made it possible to detect long-term metabolites that became widely known in connection with the re-analysis program for Beijing and the London Games reanalysis program launched by the IOC in 2016 and thereafter completed by the ITA in 2020.

B. Cases Prosecuted

208. The ITA carefully reviewed the findings and the supporting documents from Operation Arrow and conducted additional investigations into the practice of urine substitution within the sport of weightlifting.

209. As part of its investigations, the ITA was able to confirm the findings of Operation Arrow in that several athletes, often with the complicity of their respective Member Federation, were able to evade sample collection through the use of “doppelgängers” who were asked to provide clean urine samples in lieu of the athletes. The list and summary of individual cases stemming from Operation Arrow and which were asserted as ADRVs can be found in Appendix 3 to the present report.
210. In addition to the athletes charged with ADRVs for urine substitution, the ITA also investigated potential athlete support personnel or officials who organised, assisted, abetted or were complicit in any other way in urine substitution enterprises.

211. Amongst the targeted individuals was Dr Dorin Balmus ("Dr Balmus"), the Moldovan national team doctor, who was covertly recorded by ARD reporters admitting that he used doppelgängers ("people who resembled our athletes") during sample collections and has been charged by the ITA with complicity in urine substitution by three Moldovan weightlifters. Dr Balmus was informed of the charge earlier this week. Moreover, Dr Balmus also admitted (to ARD) that he would pay DCOs to ‘turn a blind eye’ and not look too closely at the passports presented by the athletes. These purported statements by Dr Balmus suggest the existence of a coordinated program of urine substitution, implicating athletes, DCOs and high-ranking officials.

C. Additional Findings

212. In addition, in the course of its investigations into the WADA List, the ITA found that the IWF was aware of sample-swapping issues in the sport of weightlifting at least as of October 2010, when the APMU reported DNA analysis results which showed that a handful of athletes had resorted to sample-swapping, including Romanian female weightlifter Ms Cocos, as explained above. The ITA did not find any evidence indicating that the IWF attempted to look into these manipulation practices back in 2010 and effectively pursue ADRVs; to the contrary. Except for the case of Ms Cocos, the cases are time-barred.

213. The ITA investigation has also demonstrated that, especially in these urine-swapping cases, athletes are not acting on their own. This modus operandi is mainly put in place by the Athlete Support Personnel ("ASPs") – the coaches and Member Federation officials. However, the lack of law enforcement-level powers (such as obtaining communication records and the ability to deploy long-term evidence collection operations) in sports-related investigations means that any ADRV charges sought against ASPs, who are often repeat offenders and primary drivers behind doping activity in weightlifting, rely heavily on witness statements and testimony of athletes trained by them.

214. Providing such witness statements/testimony continues to prove rare, as in the majority of countries where these activities are prevalent there are numerous implied or explicit threats to financial stability, inclusion in future national teams and even physical safety that prevent athletes from doing so.

215. At present, the statements of “confidential witnesses” are not widely accepted in pursuing ADRV charges against ASPs, as the arguments for the protection of a witness’s identity may be rejected by CAS. Even if the arguments are accepted, the likely personal nature of the statements/testimony, and the right to cross-examination if heard at CAS, are not sufficient to guarantee anonymity to any “confidential witnesses”.

216. Even if these concerns could be overcome, the current ADRV and Substantial Assistance regime would need further improvement to take into account the “on-the-ground” realities
and challenges to more effectively target ASPs responsible for the systemic doping of their athletes.

217. Throughout the course of the ITA investigation, the issues outlined above have proven to be dealbreakers preventing potentially cooperating athletes from assisting in bringing actionable ADRV charges against responsible ASPs.

218. That said, the ITA’s investigation into athletes and ASPs who resorted to urine substitution in the past is not over, and the ITA will continue to charge such individuals once it obtains sufficient evidence that ADRVs have been committed.

219. Moreover, these urine-substitution cases also raise questions as to the involvement of DCOs from certain NADOs and Regional Anti-Doping Organisations (“RADOs”). More concretely, the ITA’s investigation revealed that certain DCOs were also repeatedly responsible for not showing strict adherence to the identity requirements in sample collection protocols, including allegations of complicity in changing samples, giving advance notice of out-of-competition tests to athletes and National Federations and/or turning a blind eye during sample-swapping practices. These investigations are ongoing and/or have been or will be referred to the appropriate authority for continued investigations.

7.5. WHISTLEBLOWING: OBTAINING “ON-THE-GROUND” INSIGHTS AND INSTILLING TRUST AND RELIANCE IN THE ITA

220. As part of its general mandate from the IWF, the ITA’s priority is to ensure the integrity of the anti-doping program and to increase its effectiveness, and this last prong necessarily entails gathering intelligence on the doping culture in weightlifting to better understand the landscape and finesse the target testing strategy.

221. Moreover, as mentioned in the McLaren Report on the IWF, the ITA investigation did, in fact, follow up with several confidential reporters and/or whistleblowers identified through the McLaren investigations. The ITA also relied on confidential reports provided by WADA I&I.

222. During the process of the ITA’s investigation, it relied on several confidential witnesses who provided a level of insight and clarity regarding the “on-the-ground” situation in relation to doping in the sport of weightlifting in various countries.

223. The ITA instituted a strict and diligent confidential witness assessment procedure in order to critically review any and all information it was provided so as to be able to confidently rule out malicious misinformation criteria anyone tried to provide as part of this investigation, as well as to develop a clear understanding of the chain of acquisition of the information reported.

224. Furthermore, on 1 February 2021 the ITA established its own independently operated and confidentially monitored whistleblower reporting platform “REVEAL” [link]. All reports are independently assessed and responded to in accordance with the ITA’s Whistleblowing Policy.
(link). All weightlifting-related allegations originating from REVEAL since February 2021 have been investigated by the ITA in the scope of this report.

225. While this report focused on the findings related to results management in respect of ADRV cases, an additional outcome of the ITA investigation has been the recruitment of six (6) ongoing cooperating witnesses. As a result, these witnesses are in place, long-term, to provide information on doping practices across the sport of weightlifting.

226. The ITA is confident that its work and reporting systems will create a shift in culture in the sport of weightlifting and bolster whistleblowing, as well as helping the athletes, ASPs and Member Federations’ recognizing their positive responsibilities to assist WADA and/or the ITA’s fight for clean sports.

227. To illustrate how the ITA makes use of confidential information provided by whistleblowers via the confidential reporting mechanisms such as those allegations submitted both to the McLaren Team and subsequently to WADA’s “Speak up!” platform, the ITA’s investigation followed up on allegations of athletes providing intentionally misleading/fraudulent whereabouts information. As a result of an intelligence-driven testing mission, Ukrainian athlete Dmytro Chumak, a Tokyo 2020 contender, was found by Doping Control Officers to be in a location different from what he had declared in his whereabouts information, and apparently refused to provide a sample. Mr Chumak and his coach, Mykhailo Matsokha were charged by the ITA with numerous potential ADRVs in relation to this testing mission. Both are provisionally suspended and their cases are ongoing.54

228. Lastly, certain information has been either not reported publicly and/or only reported internally, as it relates to ongoing investigations and other sensitive human source operations. This internal reporting served as an outline of completed and ongoing investigations and intelligence operations of continual relevance to the ITA responsible for the IWF’s intelligence and investigation responsibilities. However, it is clear that additional resources must be devoted to continue to combat the widespread doping practices endemic to international weightlifting.

8. REFERRED MATTERS

8.1. ALLEGATIONS OF MISCONDUCT RELATED TO MATTERS NOT IN THE SCOPE OF THE ANTI-DOPING RULES

229. During its investigation, the ITA came across evidence of wrongdoing which was outside the scope of the ITA’s mandate. This included identified misconduct such as, but not limited to, contractual malfeasance, a fishy transfer market for athlete nationality, and indications of misappropriation and financial impropriety related to fines imposed in doping cases.

230. As previously mentioned, and for the sake of clarity, any potential activities identified in the course of ITA’s investigation which could be classified as additional allegations or evidence of misconduct were documented accordingly.

231. As such, these matters will be referred to the appropriate authorities for continued investigations.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX 1 – WADA List – FINDINGS

I. 29 “LOST CASES”

The 29 cases included in the WADA List which could not be prosecuted due to statute of limitation and/or destruction of evidence are as follows:

13 cases under the TA of IWF

- 1 AAF for anabolic steroids from 2009 from an Athlete from the Chinese Taipei Member Federation. The Athlete did not compete for a decade.

- 3 AAFs for anabolic steroids from 2010 during an Out-of-Competition mission conducted by the IWF in Egypt. The ITA was not able to identify the owners of the samples and cannot ascertain whether the Athletes were from the Egyptian Weightlifting Federation.

- 1 AAF for human chorionic gonadotropin (hCG) of 2010 during an In-Competition mission in an event in Cuba. The ITA was not able to identify the owner of the sample and cannot ascertain whether the Athlete was from the Cuban Weightlifting Federation. However, the WADA-accredited laboratory indicated that the level of hCG was too elevated to be compatible with the declared gender of the Athlete (male) and that such levels are only compatible with pregnancy. In the event that the sample belonged to a woman, this case would not have been considered as an AAF.

- 4 AAFs (anabolic steroids) in 2010 and 1 AAF in 2011 from four Athletes from the TWF. One Athlete had two AAFs. Two of the 5 cases were mentioned in the McLaren Report: “Both athletes went on to compete at the World Championships in Antalya, Turkey on 17 September 2010 and subsequently at the European Championships in Kazan, Russia in April 2011. One of them won gold on both occasions and the other won silver at the World Championships. The athletes retained their medals from these competitions”.

- 1 AAF for anabolic steroids in 2011 collected during the 26th South East Asian Games in Indonesia. The identity of the Athlete could not be confirmed. The initial Results Management Authority for this case was the Major Event Organiser, here the SEA Games Organizing Committee (“INASOC”). Once the consequences related to the Games would have been imposed, the results management should have been transferred to the IWF for further sanction. Based on the information collected by the ITA, this case was never processed by INASOC or the IWF.

- 1 AAF for anabolic steroids in 2013 collected during an in-competition mission in an event in Indonesia. The identity of the Athlete could not be confirmed.

- 2 AAFs (considered as 1 case) for anabolic steroids in 2014 from an Athlete from the Iran Weightlifting Federation. The test was conducted by the Turkish NADO, however the Turkish NADO could not go forward with the results management since it lacked jurisdiction. The IWF had default jurisdiction under Code Article 7.1 and should have taken over the case.

See from McLaren Report on the IWF footnote “61 The athlete later provided a positive OOC sample on 26 October 2011, for which she received a 2-year ban”.

See from McLaren Report on the IWF footnote: “62 Both athletes were also found guilty of doping in 2016, when their Beijing 2008 samples were found positive during the IOC reanalysis”.

55  See from McLaren Report on the IWF footnote “61 The athlete later provided a positive OOC sample on 26 October 2011, for which she received a 2-year ban”.

56  See from McLaren Report on the IWF footnote: “62 Both athletes were also found guilty of doping in 2016, when their Beijing 2008 samples were found positive during the IOC reanalysis”.
16 Cases under the Testing Authority of Member Federation

- 11 AAFs under the TA of the Egyptian Weightlifting Federation (“EWF”):
  - 4 AAFs (anabolic steroids) in 2009 from 4 different athletes where no records of sanctions could be produced by the EWF. The EWF did however assist the ITA in identifying who the samples belonged to. The ITA investigation has found that 3 of the Athletes did not participate in IWF events after providing the positive samples. One Athlete however did participate in an IWF event in 2010, where the Athlete produced a positive sample and was sanctioned by IWF for a two-year period of ineligibility.
  - 7 AAFs (5 anabolic steroids and 2 diuretics) in 2010 where no records of the sanctions nor the identity of the Athlete could be produced by the EWF. Despite best efforts, the ITA was not able to obtain any relevant information on the owners of the samples.

- El Salvador Weightlifting Federation (“SWF”): 1 AAF for anabolic steroids in 2010 under the authority of SWF. The SWF explained that it was not in a position to provide any information on the case and despite best efforts, the ITA was not able to obtain any details on the matter, except that the A and B-sample had been discarded from the WADA-accredited laboratory. The matter could thus not be brought forward at this stage.

- Pakistan Weightlifting Federation (“PWF”): 1 AAF for anabolic steroids dating back to 2012. The PWF was not able to produce records of the decision and the ITA could not confirm the accuracy of the information provided by the PWF about this case. The WADA-accredited laboratory confirmed that the samples had been destroyed in the meantime. The Athlete’s identity remains unknown and the ITA considers that this case not processed.

- 2 AAFs for anabolic steroids of 2010 and 1 AAF for a diuretic from 2011 for the Turkish Weightlifting Federation. One athlete was later sanctioned for another ADRV. One stopped competing after the AAF. The other athlete could not be identified.

II. 5 CASES – NOT CONSIDERED AS ADRVs

- The ITA also reviewed 5 cases included on the WADA List, but after further investigation, the ITA found that those did not constitute ADRVs. Three cases of 2011 concerned clenbuterol in low concentrations which today would not be considered as ADRV due to the phenomenon of meat contamination. The Athletes were Chinese and Mexican. There was one instance of potential Prohibited Association in 2018 for a Turkmenistan Athlete, but where the evidence did not amount to an ADRV. Lastly, another case concerned a prohibited beta-2 agonist from 2012 for an Athlete from Bahrain and the amount detected was no longer considered an AAF pursuant to the current WADA documentation.

- Pursuant to the Code, the ITA issued “reasoned decisions” as to why these 5 cases should not have been considered as ADRVs at all. The Parties with a right of appeal to CAS, namely WADA.

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and the relevant NADO, were notified of the decisions to close the matters. None of the parties have appealed ITA’s decisions.

III. 12 CASES – RESULTS MANAGEMENT RESUMED BY THE ITA

- 1 AAF for a glucocorticoid from an Athlete from the EWF. The Athlete is no longer active. When notified of the case back in 2010, the Athlete had argued that he should obtain a Therapeutic Use Exemption, but the request was never followed through by the IWF. The Therapeutic Use Exemption request is currently reviewed by the ITA Therapeutic Use Exemption Committee.

- 3 AAFs for anabolic steroids from 2011. With the assistance of the ITA, The EWF was however able to resume results management authority for 3 AAFs from 2011 since there were no issues of statute of limitations and the B-samples were still available. The EWF has sanctioned the Athletes with the applicable two year period of ineligibility.

- 1 AAF for an anabolic steroid from an in-competition test relating to an Athlete from the Romanian Weightlifting Federation in 2012. The Athlete has been informed of the case by the ITA and the results management is ongoing.

- 1 AAF for an anabolic steroid from the re-analysis of a sample collected during the 2012 Olympic Games from an Athlete affiliated with the TWF. The ITA has issued a sanctioning decision and the matter has been resolved.

- 1 AAF for a specified stimulant from a sample collected during the 2014 South American Games. Upon inquiry, the laboratory confirmed that the B-sample is still available. The Athlete has been informed of the case by the ITA and the results management is ongoing.

- 1 case for administration of prohibited substance against an Athlete Support Personnel, who was a coach for the Mexican Weightlifting Federation at the time of the ADRV. The case had been initiated in 2018 and the ITA resumed proceedings. The ASP has been sanctioned with a life ban.

- 3 AAFs for anabolic steroids in 2015 for 3 Athletes from the Mongolian Weightlifting Federation (“MWF”) based on testing conducted by the Mongolian National Anti-Doping Organisation. Based on the information provided by the IWF, these cases had not been sanctioned. Upon inquiry, the MWF confirmed to the ITA that the Athletes had received 5-month bans, which was not consistent with the IWF ADR which provides for a four-year of ineligibility. The ITA, on behalf of the IWF, appealed these decisions to the Court of Arbitration for Sport. The MWF thus agreed to retry the cases and imposed a four-year period of ineligibility against the Athletes. The CAS appeal was withdrawn. Considering that the AAF came from national testing, Article 12 is not at play here.

- 1 AAF for an anabolic steroid from a sample collected in 2016 during an IWF Masters event. Upon inquiry, the laboratory informed the ITA that B-sample was still available. With the assistance if the ITA, IWF Masters has resumed the results management of this case.
## APPENDIX 2 – ADRVs asserted by the ITA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Athlete</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Date of ADRV</th>
<th>Type of ADRV</th>
<th>Sanction</th>
<th>Means of Resolution</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Nadezhda Lomova</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>15 Mar 2019</td>
<td>Art. 2.1 – Presence of metenolone and metabolite</td>
<td>Period of Ineligibility of 8 years - 4 April 2019 until 3 April 2027</td>
<td>ITA Sanctioning Decision</td>
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<td>Bilkis Abiodun Otunla</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>28 Apr 2019</td>
<td>Art. 2.1 – Presence of metenolone and metabolite</td>
<td>Period of Ineligibility of 8 years – 6 June 2019 to 5 June 2027</td>
<td>ITA Agreement</td>
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<td>Rustam Djangabaev</td>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>30 May 2018</td>
<td>Article 2.2 – Use of Prohibited Method (Sample Substitution)</td>
<td>Period of Ineligibility of 4 years - 24 February 2019 until 23 February 2023</td>
<td>ITA AoC</td>
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<td>Luis Alberto Coca Sierra</td>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>27 Apr 2019</td>
<td>Art. 2.1 – Presence of boldenone and clenbuterol</td>
<td>Period of Ineligibility of 4 years - 27 April 2019 until 26 April 2023</td>
<td>ITA Sanctioning Decision</td>
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<td>Tania Guadalupe Mascaro</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
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<td>Cristopher Pavan</td>
<td>Honduras</td>
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<td>Eleni Konstantinidi</td>
<td>Greece</td>
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<td>Swati Singh</td>
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<td>Period of Ineligibility of 2 years - 20 December 2018 until 19 December 2020</td>
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59 Out of Competition.
60 In-Competition.
61 DHCMT is Dehydrochlormethyltestosterone metabolite or as it is commonly known as “Oral Turinabol.”
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Name of Athlete</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Date of ADRV</th>
<th>Type of ADRV</th>
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<td>Period of Ineligibility of 8 years – 4 November 2019 until 3 November 2027</td>
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<td>Khaled Korany Mohamed</td>
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<td>Georgios Markoulas</td>
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<td>5 Oct 2019 (INC)</td>
<td>Art. 2.1 – Presence of methyltestosterone metabolites</td>
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<td>Shih-Chieh Chen</td>
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<td>Art. 2.1 – Presence of 5αAdiol and/or 5βAdiol</td>
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<td>Paul Dumitrascu</td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>21 Oct 2019 (INC)</td>
<td>Art. 2.1 – Presence of Carboxy-THC</td>
<td>Period of Ineligibility of 10 months - 18 December 2019 until 17 October 2020</td>
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<td>Vadzim Likhorad</td>
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<td>5 Nov 2019 (OOC)</td>
<td>Art. 2.1 – Presence of DHCMT metabolites</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thi Thu Trang Nguyen</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>16 Nov 2019 (OOC)</td>
<td>Art. 2.1 – Presence of oxandrolone and metabolites</td>
<td>Period of Ineligibility of 4 years - 27 January 2020 until 26 January 2024</td>
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<td>Erol Bilgin</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>30 Jul 2012 (INC)</td>
<td>Art. 2.1 – Presence of Stanozolol and DHCMT metabolites</td>
<td>Period of Ineligibility of 2 years – 10 January 2020 until 9 January 2022</td>
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<td>Razvan Martin</td>
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<td>31 Jul 2012 (INC)</td>
<td>Art. 2.1 – Presence of Stanozolol, Metenolone and DHCMT metabolites</td>
<td>Period of Ineligibility of 2 years - 15 December 2025 until 14 December 2027</td>
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<td>Roxana Cocos</td>
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<td>13 Apr 2012 (INC)</td>
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<td>Period of Ineligibility of 2 years - 13 August 2024 until 12 August 2026</td>
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<td>Gabriel Sincaian</td>
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<td>Period of Ineligibility of 4 years - 24 February 2020 until 23 February 2024</td>
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<td>Ana Iris Segura</td>
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<td>20 Jan 2020 (OOC)</td>
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<td>Iraq</td>
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<td>Alaifuri Salwan</td>
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<td>Name of Athlete</td>
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<td>Mushtad Mohamed</td>
<td>Oman</td>
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<td>Period of Ineligibility of 4 years - 7 April 2020 until 6 April 2024</td>
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<td>Lukasz Roman Grela</td>
<td>Poland</td>
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<td>Period of Ineligibility of 4 years - 7 April 2020 until 6 April 2024</td>
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<td>Andrey Demanov</td>
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<td>Art. 2.1 Presence of prohibited substances and Art. 2.2 – Use of prohibited substances (LIMS Case)</td>
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<td>Rinat Kireev</td>
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<td>Ekaterina Katina</td>
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<td>Florin Croitoru</td>
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<td>Art. 2.1 Presence of Stanozolol, Metenolone and DHCMT metabolites</td>
<td>Period of Ineligibility of 2 years - 13 March 2019 until 12 March 2021</td>
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<td>Mel Daluzyan</td>
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<td>Art. 2.1 Presence of Stanozolol and DHCMT metabolites</td>
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<td>Valentin Hristov</td>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>26 Jul 2012</td>
<td>Art. 2.1 Presence of DHCMT metabolites</td>
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<td>ITA Sanctioning Decision</td>
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<td>Mikolai Novikau</td>
<td>Belarus</td>
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<td>Iurie Bulat</td>
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<td>Article 2.2 – Use of Prohibited Method (Sample Substitution)</td>
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<td>Maksim Mudreuski</td>
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<td>4 Mar 2016</td>
<td>Article 2.2 – Use of Prohibited Method (Sample Substitution)</td>
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<td>Mustafa Radha Almulaad</td>
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<td>Todor Yordanow</td>
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<td>Art. 2.1 Presence of 5αAdiol and/or 5βAdiol</td>
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<td>Jean Yannick Coret</td>
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<td>Art. 2.4 – 3 Whereabout Failures</td>
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<td>Rattikan Guinoi</td>
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<td>Ning Liu</td>
<td>China/Thailand</td>
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<td>Art. 2.8 - Administration; and Art. 2.9 - Complicity</td>
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<td>Akkoev Khadzhimurat</td>
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<td>Name of Athlete</td>
<td>Nationality</td>
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<td>Type of ADRV</td>
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<td>Rempeis Konstantinos</td>
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<td>Dumitu Cuptari</td>
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<td>27 June 2016 (OOC)</td>
<td>Article 2.2 – Use of Prohibited Method (Sample Substitution)</td>
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<td>Nijat Rahimov</td>
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<td>15 Mar 2016 (OOC)</td>
<td>Article 2.2 – Use of Prohibited Method (Sample Substitution)</td>
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<td>Angel José Luna Marín</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>5 Jan 2021 (OOC)</td>
<td>Art. 2.1 – Presence of Boldenone and metabolite</td>
<td>Period of Ineligibility of 3 years - 17 February 2021 until 16 February 2024</td>
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<td>Nathasha Rosa Figueiredo</td>
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<td>Boyanka Minkova</td>
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<td>Art. 2.1 – Presence of stanozolol metabolite</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dmytro Chumak</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>6 May 2021 (OOC)</td>
<td>Art. 2.2 – Use of Prohibited Substance, Art. 2.3 – Evading/Refusing Sample</td>
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<td>Matsokha Mykhailo</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>6 May 2021 (OOC)</td>
<td>Art. 2.5 – Tampering and Art. 2.9 - Assisting, encouraging or complicity</td>
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<td>Yunder Beytula</td>
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<td>29 Dec 2020 (OOC)</td>
<td>Art. 2.3 – Evading/Refusing Sample Collection</td>
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### APPENDIX 3 – Operation Arrow Cases

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<tr>
<th>Name of Athlete</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Date of ADRV</th>
<th>Status</th>
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<tr>
<td>Elmar Aliyev</td>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>13 June 2016 (OOC)</td>
<td>Case handled by the IWF - Period of Ineligibility of 4 years – 12 September 2018 until 12 September 2022</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stanislau Chadovich</td>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>26 Sept 2014 (OOC)</td>
<td>Case handled by the IWF - Period of Ineligibility of 4 years – 29 July 2016 until 29 July 2020</td>
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<td>Maksim Mudreuski</td>
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<td>4 Mar 2016 (OOC)</td>
<td>Case handled by the ITA - Period of Ineligibility of 4 years - 3 August 2020 until 2 August 2024</td>
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<td>Nijat Rahimov</td>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>15 Mar 2016 (OOC)</td>
<td>Case handled by the ITA – Currently pending before CAS ADD</td>
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<td>Nadezhda Nogay</td>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>10 Jun 2016 (OOC)</td>
<td>Case handled by the IWF – Period of Ineligibility of 4 years – 10 June 2017 until 10 June 2021</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iurie Bulat</td>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>8 Nov 2015 (OOC)</td>
<td>Case handled by the ITA – athlete already sanctioned by IWF for 4 years from 21 December 2015 until 21 December 2019. No additional period of Ineligibility.</td>
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<td>Ghenadie Dudoglo</td>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>8 Nov 2015 (OOC)</td>
<td>Case handled by the IWF – athlete already sanctioned by IWF for 4 years from 19 December 2015 until 19 December 2019. No additional period of Ineligibility.</td>
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<td>Artiom Pipa</td>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>8 Nov 2015 (OOC)</td>
<td>Case handled by the IWF – athlete already sanctioned by IWF for 4 years from 19 December 2015 until 19 December 2019. No additional period of Ineligibility.</td>
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<td>Dumitru Captari</td>
<td>Romania</td>
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<td>Case handled by the ITA – Results Management ongoing</td>
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<td>Rustam Djangabaev</td>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>30 May 2018 (OOC)</td>
<td>Case handled by the ITA - Period of Ineligibility of 4 years - 24 February 2019 until 23 February 2023</td>
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